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THE SECTION 6651(a)(1)





Late filing penalties are imposed under section 6651 (a)(1) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code unless the taxpayer can demonstrate reasonable cause for the failure to file.
Whether delegation to a tax adviser who fails to file the return on time constitutes
reasonable cause has been a source of controversy among the courts. While some
courts never consider delegation to a tax adviser to be reasonable cause, others will
examine whether the taxpayer's reliance on the adviser itself was reasonable The
author suggests that the courts' analyses have been flawed and recommends that the
statute be amended to impose direct, rather than derivative, liability on the tax ad-
viser. Special emphasis is placed on the Seventh Circuit decision in United States v.
Boyle. In an addendum, the author discusses the recent Supreme Court reversal of
Boyle and the questions it leaves unresolved.
INTRODUCTION
TAXES, ACCORDING TO Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, are
the price we pay for a civilized society.' Tax protesters may not
agree with this sentiment, but Congress and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) apparently do. As part of the struggle against
barbarians, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) of 19542 requires tax-
payers to file a variety of tax returns. Individuals3 and corpora-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. B.A., Grinnell College (1969);
J.D., University of Illinois (1974); LL.M., New York University (1981).
In this Article, the author discusses two cases, Estate of Moran v. United States, 46
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1148,400 (7th Cir. 1980), and Fleming v. United States, 648 F.2d 1122
(7th Cir. 1981), in which she wrote briefs while employed in the Tax Division, Appellate
Section of the United States Department of Justice. The views expressed herein are the au-
thor's and should not be attributed to the Department of Justice. The author acknowledges
the invaluable assistance of her research assistants, Mark A. Basil, J. Michael Bernard, and
Jeffrey M. Koltun.
I. Compania General De Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927).
2. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736,
68A Stat. (1954) (as amended).
3. I.R.C. § 6012 (1982). An individual who is not married, is not a surviving spouse
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tions4 must file income tax returns, donors must file gift tax
returns,5 and executors of many estates must file estate tax returns.6
A taxpayer who fails to fie a required return on time is subject to a
late filing penalty.7 The penalty imposed for late filing is not minor;
it amounts to five percent of the tax owed per month, with a frac-
tional part of a month counted for the full five percent, up to a
maximum of twenty-five percent.' Section 6651(a)(1) of the IRC
provides that a penalty for late filing will be imposed "unless it is
shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to
willful neglect."9 The regulations accompanying this section define
reasonable cause as the exercise of "ordinary business care and pru-
dence." 10 Although the existence of the penalty encourages the vast
majority of taxpayers to file on time, it also has served as a fertile
and has gross income of less than $2,300 is not required to file an income tax return. See id.
§ 63(d). Similarly, an individual entitled to file a joint return need not file if the combined
gross income of the taxpayer and his spouse is less than $3,400. See id.
4. Id. § 6012(a)(2).
5. Id. § 6019. A gift tax return need not be filed where the transfer was (1) under
$10,000 and not of a future interest in property, id. §§ 6019, 2503(b); (2) made on behalf of an
individual as tuition to a qualified educational organization, id. §§ 6019(1), 2503(e)(1),
(2)(A), see also id. § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) (defining qualified educational organization); (3) made
on behalf of an individual to any person as payment for provision of qualified medical care,
id. §§ 6019(l), 2503(1), (2)(B), see also id. § 213(d)(1) (defining qualified medical care); or
(4) one involving an interest in property made to a donee who at the time of the gift was the
donor's spouse, id. §§ 6019(2), 2523(a).
6. Id. § 6018(a)(1). The size of the gross estate which triggers the estate tax filing
requirement has increased steadily. Prior to January 1, 1977, an executor was required to file
an estate tax return if the gross estate exceeded $60,000. A return did not need to be filed for
a decedent dying in 1977, however, unless the gross estate exceeded $120,000, or for a dece-
dent dying in 1978 unless the gross estate exceeded $134,000. For the years 1979 through
1986, the figures are $147,000, $161,000, $175,000, $225,000, $325,000, $400,000, $500,000,
and $600,000, respectively. For decedents dying after 1986, estate tax returns will be re-
quired only where the gross estate exceeds $600,000. Id. § 6018(a)(1)(3). The executor is
also responsible for filing the decedent's final income tax return, id. § 6012(b)(1), and the
estate's income tax return, id. § 641.
7. Id. § 6651(a)(1).
8. Id. See Estate of Geraci v. Commissioner, 502 F.2d 1148, 1149 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975). In addition, there is a penalty of one-half of one percent per
month of the tax owed for the late payment of tax. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2) (1982). If both filing
and payment are late, the aggregate penalty can exceed 25%. See, e.g., DiSimone v. United
States, 580 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Smith v. United States, 571 F. Supp. 664
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Gerdes v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Cal. 1980). Payment of
estimated taxes owed does not preclude imposition of a penalty for late filing. See Estate of
Kerber v. United States, 717 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1983), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Doing
v. United States, 52 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1983) (No. 83-1038).
9. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) (1982).
10. Treas. Reg. 301, § 6651-1(c)(1), T.D. 7260, 1973-1 C.B. 590.
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source of litigation, especially in the estate tax area." Reasonable
cause is almost always the focal point of disputes, 12 since the tax-
payer's lateness rarely is found to constitute willful neglect. 3 Most
11. The reported decisions number in the hundreds. See, eg., infra notes 12-16 and
cases cited therein.
While these decisions include a substantial complement of income and gift tax cases, the
primary field of battle has been the late-filed estate tax return. There are at least two plausi-
ble explanations for the preponderance of estate tax cases. First, the amount of money at
issue probably is greater in estate tax cases than in income and gift tax controversies, because
of the one-time nature of the estate tax. The size of a decedent's taxable estate usually is
significantly larger than the amount of his taxable income or taxable gifts for any particular
year. As a result, the amount of estate tax owed is likely to be greater than the amount of
income or gift tax owed for that year. Because the penalty is a percentage of the tax owed, the
greater the amount of the tax, the greater the potential penalty. Potentially larger penalties
probably encourage taxpayers to contest their assessments in court.
Second, most taxpayers are more knowledgeable about their income tax responsibilities
than they are about an executor's obligations. See infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
In particular, an individual is more likely to know that his income tax return is due by April
15 than that an estate tax return is due nine months after a decedent's death. See I.R.C.
§§ 6072(a), 6075 (1982). The income tax return due date is a specific, fixed deadline that
receives a great deal of media attention, while the estate tax return has "a floating due date
keyed to the timing of the death of a particular decedent." Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611
F.2d 211, 214 (7th Cir. 1979); see infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text. Although the
Rohrabaugh opinion is generally not well-reasoned, the court correctly perceived that there
was greater public awareness of income tax deadlines than of estate tax deadlines. See infra
notes 111-55 and accompanying text.
For a general discussion on the topic of late filing of tax returns, see Arth, Avoiding the
Penalty for Late Filing of the Estate Tax Return: An Analysis, 48 J. TAX'N 358 (1978);
Asimow, Civil Penalties for Inaccurate and Delinquent Tax Returns, 23 UCLA L. REv. 637
(1976); Cohen, Failure to File Tax Returns and Professional Discipline, 49 L.A. B. BULL. 328
(1974); Harris & Warner, Estate Late Filing Penalty Under Section 6651: New Stricter Inter-
pretations, 57 TAXES 275 (1979); Hantley, Civil Penalties for Late Filing of Federal Tax Re-
turns, 29 J. Mo. B. 290 (1973); Levy, Limitations on Reliance on Tax Advisors Under Federal
Law, 87 COM. L.J. 18 (1982); Purcell & Manolakas, When can taxpayers avoid a penalty for
failure to file a return or pay the the tax?, 28 TAX'N Accr. 380 (1982); Reisner, Relief From
Delinquency Penalties: The InternalRevenue Code, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 183 (1949); Note, Late
Filing for Federal Estate Tax Returns: Reliance on Attorney as Reasonable Cause, 32 DRAKE
L. REV. 157 (1982-83); Note, Reasonable Cause for the Late Filing of Estate Tax Returns, 11
IND. L. REV. 621 (1978); Comment, Reliance on an Expert as Reasonable Cause for Delin-
quent Estate Tax Returns: The Inconsistent Applications of United States v. Kroll, 49 U. CiN.
L. REv. 847 0980).
12. A taxpayer who seeks to avoid imposition of a late-filing penalty has the burden of
proof both as to the absence of willful neglect and the presence of reasonable cause. Manning
v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 815, 817 (1st Cir. 1980); see Robinson's Dairy, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 302 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1962); United States v. Steck, 295 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1961);
Daley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 808 (D.N.D. 1979); Estate of Campbell v. United States,
449 F. Supp. 675 (D.N.L 1977); Richter v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1977);
Kessler v. Charles, 256 F. Supp. 21 (S.D. Ohio 1966). Indeed, imposition of the penalty is
mandatory, absent demonstration of this proof by the taxpayer. Estate of Geraci v. Commis-
sioner, 502 F.2d 1148, 1149 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975); Rubber Research,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 422 F.2d 1402, 1407 (8th Cir. 1970); Daley v. United States, 480 F.
Supp. 808, 810 (D.N.D. 1979).
13. See Educational Fund of the Elec. Indus. v. United States, 426 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.
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taxpayers who dispute imposition of the penalty claim reliance on
expert advice, either from an attorney or an accountant. 14 The tax-
payer who asserts such reliance must demonstrate that he reason-
ably believed his adviser to be competent in tax law,15 and that he
made full disclosure of all pertinent information.16
The standard of appellate review emphasizes the factual nature
of lower court decisions. Some courts characterize the question of
whether reasonable cause is present as one of fact.17 Others view
the question as a mixed question of law and fact. Under this more
sophisticated approach, which elements constitute reasonable cause
is a question of law, and whether those elements are present is a
question of fact."8 The precise standard of review usually is unim-
portant, as there is seldom any indication that a different standard
of review would result in a different conclusion. 9 Courts often find
that prior decisions have little precedential value because of the fac-
tual peculiarity of each case.20
1970); Ferrando v. United States, 245 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1957); First County Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 837 (D.N.J. 1968); Hollenbeck v. United States, 31
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 147,803 (D. Colo. 1972).
14. See infra notes 15-16.
15. See Commissioner v. American Ass'n of Eng'rs Employment, Inc., 204 F.2d 19 (7th
Cir. 1953); Orient Inv. & Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1948); United
States v. Martin, 274 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Mo. 1967); Wood v. United States, 163 F. Supp.
426 (E.D. Tex. 1958); Walnut St. Co. v. Glenn, 83 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Ky. 1948).
16. See Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1950);
Miller v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 758 (D. Wyo. 1962); Spouting Rock Beach Corp. v.
United States, 176 F. Supp. 938 (D.R.I. 1959); Durovic v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1364
(1970); Nelson v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 575 (1952).
17. Stevens Bros. Found., Inc. v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 633, 646 (8th Cir. 1963);
Bryan v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 1960); Sami v. United States, 277 F.2d
153, 154 (5th Cir. 1960); Coates v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 459, 462 (8th Cir. 1956); Latham
Park Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 199, 219 (1977).
18. Sanderling, Inc. v. Commissioner, 571 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1978); Haywood Lum-
ber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769, 772 (2d Cir. 1949); Orient Inv. & Fin. Co.
v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 601, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Daley v. United States, 480 F. Supp.
808, 811 (D.N.D. 1979); Giesen v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 33, 35 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
19. See Estate of Bradley v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 70, 72 (1974), affd, 511
F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1975); Coates v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 459, 462 (8th Cir. 1956); Rosen-
blatt v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 63, 67 (1977); Kimmes v. Commissioner, 22
T.C.M. (CCH) 232, 236 (1963).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) states that findings of fact must be affirmed unless clearly
erroneous, and that due regard must be given to the finder's of fact ability to judge the
credibility of witnesses. Congress has attached identical weight to the findings of the Tax
Court. See I.R.C. § 7482(a) (1982); Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960).
See also infra note 46. By comparison, in Fisk v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 358, 359 (6th Cir.
1953) and Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211, 215, 219 (7th Cir. 1979), the courts
suggested that they would reach the same conclusion regardless of whether the question were
one of fact or of law.
[Vol. 35:183
PENALTY FOR LATE TAX RETURNS
The cases in which taxpayers assert reliance on their advisers as
a defense to the penalty typically involve two scenarios. In the first,
the "whether" cases, the adviser has given erroneous advice about
whether a return must be filed. Most courts do not impose the late
filing penalty on a taxpayer who receives erroneous advice that no
return is required.21 In the second scenario, the "when" cases, the
taxpayer knows a return is required. If the taxpayer also knows the
return's due date, he has a personal, nondelegable duty to file the
return on time.22 In this situation, courts do not allow a taxpayer to
avoid the penalty solely on the ground that he relied on his adviser
to make a timely filing.
Complications arise, however, when a taxpayer knows a return
is required but does not know its due date. Ignorance about a re-
turn's due date results in late filing when either the taxpayer failed
to inquire about the deadline, or the adviser miscalculated the due
date and has given erroneous advice. In the first situation, the re-
turn is late because the adviser is busy or forgetful and the taxpayer,
who did not ask about the deadline, did not prod him into timely
action. In the second situation, the filing occurs after the actual
deadline, but within the time the taxpayer believes is available.
Here, the taxpayer's failure to prod his agent into earlier action is
due to his belief that the agent is acting in a timely fashion.
The courts disagree about the proper results in these situations.
In Boyle v. United States,23 the Seventh Circuit held that a taxpayer
has no duty to inquire about the due date of a required return. The
Eighth Circuit, however, has imposed a duty of inquiry. 24 The Sev-
enth25 and Eighth26 Circuits penalize the taxpayer if he makes the
inquiry, is told the wrong due date, and files after the return is due,
but within the time he believes is available, while the Sixth Circuit
does not impose a penalty in these circumstances.27
This Article examines the "whether" and "when" cases. It first
examines cases where a taxpayer failed to file a return either on
advice of an expert or because advice was not sought, and the tax-
21. See infra notes 30-32.
22. United States v. Kroll, 547 F.2d 393, 396 (7th Cir. 1977).
23. 710 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1676 (1984).
24. Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1981).
25. Fleming v. United States, 648 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1981).
26. Estate of Kerber v. United States, 717 F.2d 454 (8th Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub
non Doring v. United States, 52 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1983) (No. 83-1038); Smith v.
United States, 702 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1983); Boeving v. United States, 650 F.2d 493 (8th Cir.
1981).
27. Estate of Bradley v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 526 (6th Cir. 1975).
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payer was unaware that a return was required. Next, this Article
examines the "when" cases. After consideration of those cases in
which the taxpayer filed late with knowledge of the actual due date,
this Article discusses and analyzes in detail the recent Seventh and
Eighth Circuit cases. The author maintains that the courts' focus
on the distinction between the "whether" and "when" cases has
been overbroad. Recognizing the importance of this distinction, the
author argues that the "when" cases also must consider whether the
taxpayer inquired about the due date or received erroneous advice
about that date. The author also recommends that section
6651(a)(1) be amended to impose direct, rather than derivative, lia-
bility for negligence on tax advisers.
I. THE "WHETHER" CASES
A. The Taxpayer Fails to File on the Advice of a Tax Adviser
The simplest explanation for missing a filing date is that the tax-
payer did not know the return was required. The return is late not
because the taxpayer miscalculated the due date or inadvertently
missed it, but because he thought no return was necessary. Gener-
ally, taxpayers can avoid the section 6651(a)(1) penalty if they can
prove reliance on advice that no return was required. 28
If the taxpayer consults a tax adviser whom he reasonably be-
lieves to be competent, makes full disclosure of all pertinent infor-
mation, and receives advice that a return is not required, he has
reasonable cause for not filing, even if the advice is substantively
erroneous.29 The leading cases for this proposition are a trio of
early decisions, Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner,30 Orient Investment
& Finance Co. v. Commissioner,3 and Haywood Lumber & Mining
Co. v. Commissioner.32 In each of these cases a corporate taxpayer
was given erroneous advice not to file a personal holding company
return.33 The incorrect advice was the result of the complicated
nature of the new and not-well-understood personal holding com-
pany tax provisions.34 Other personal holding company cases,35
28. United States v. Kroll, 547 F.2d 393, 396-97 (7th Cir. 1977).
29. See infra notes 30-32.
30. 162 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1947).
31. 166 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
32. 178 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1950).
33. Hatfried, 162 F.2d at 632; Orient Inv. & Fin. Co., 166 F.2d at 602; Haywood Lum-
ber, 178 F.2d at 770-71.
34. The personal holding company provisions were first enacted in 1934 as a method of
thwarting tax avoidance devices. See Int. Rev. Code of 1932, ch. 277, § 351, 48 Stat. 751
(current version at I.R.C. § 541 (1982)). Given their complexity, it was easy to make errors
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cases involving declarations of estimated tax,36 and those deciding
whether an organization qualified for tax-exempt status37 promptly
followed these decisions.
The courts in the personal holding company cases gave two rea-
sons why reliance on professional tax advice constituted reasonable
cause for not filing. First, the applicable statute had been
amended.38  The predecessor to section 6651(a)(1) originally ex-
cused late filing upon a showing of reasonable cause, and imposed a
mandatory penalty for a complete failure to fle.39 In 1936, this pro-
vision was amended to permit a showing of reasonable cause for
complete failure to file." In Commissioner v. Lane- Wells Co.,41 the
corporate taxpayer, on advice of counsel, did not file a personal
holding company return for the years 1934 through 1936.42 The
Supreme Court sustained imposition of the penalty for 1934 and
1935, but remanded the case for the limited purpose of reconsider-
ing the penalty for 1936. 43 In Hatfried, the Third Circuit noted that
the statutory change meant that failure to file no longer resulted in
an automatic penalty," while the District of Columbia Circuit, in
Orient Investment, stated that the purpose of the reasonable cause
exception was to prevent the hardships which result from erroneous
advice.45
Second, the courts advanced a practical reason for not penaliz-
in attempting to apply these provisions. These three early decisions each involved taxable
years during which the provisions were still new and not well understood. See Hatfried, 162
F.2d at 629; Orient Inv. & Fin. Co., 166 F.2d at 601; Haywood Lumber, 178 F.2d at 770.
35. See, eg., Burton Swartz Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1952);
Walnut St. Co. v. Glenn, 83 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Ky. 1948); Amo Realty Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 24 T.C. 812 (1955); 0. Falk's Dept. Store, Inc. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 56 (1953);
Reliance Factoring Corp. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 604 (1950); Parsch Realty Co. v. Com-
missioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 845 (1954).
36. See Seletos v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1958); Wood v. United States,
163 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Tex. 1958); Burck v. Campbell, 58-1 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
§ 9312 (S.D. Ind. 1958); Johnson v. United States, 58-1 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
§ 9222 (D. Or. 1957); Comelio v. Commissioner, 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 393 (1959).
37. Eg., Commissioner v. American Ass'n of Eng'rs Employment, Inc., 204 F.2d 19
(7th Cir. 1953).
38. See supra note 34.
39. Int. Rev. Code of 1934, ch. 277, § 291, 48 Stat. 746 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 6651(a) (1982)).
40. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 291, 49 Stat. 1648, 1727 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 6651(a) (1982)).
41. 321 U.S. 219 (1944).
42. Id. at 220.
43. Id. at 224-25.
44. 162 F.2d at 632.
45. 166 F.2d at 604.
1984]
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ing the taxpayer who had relied on professional advice not to file.'
The determination whether a taxpayer is subject to the personal
holding tax provisions,47 is a tax-exempt organization," or must ifie
a declaration of estimated tax,49 is not simple. The taxpayer reason-
ably can rely on a tax adviser's statement even if it is erroneous
because the taxpayer typically neither is aware that it is incorrect
nor has reason to make further inquiry. Thus, if the taxpayer
selects a purportedly competent adviser, supplies him with the nec-
essary information, and relies on advice that no return need be filed,
the taxpayer has conducted himself properly. The courts have cor-
rectly focused on the taxpayer's conduct to find that in this situa-
tion the taxpayer has acted with ordinary business care and
prudence.50
These three early decisions thus rejected the government's argu-
ment that the taxpayers' own conduct was improper. In the alter-
native, the government argued that an agency theory was applicable
and sought to impute the negligence or mistakes of the advisers to
the taxpayers. The courts, however, rejected this argument.-5
Thus, the court in Hatfried pointed out that it was "absurd" to al-
low taxpayers to use advisers and yet hold them liable when their
advisers err. 52 In Orient Investment, the court viewed the imposi-
tion of penalties in such circumstances as "contrary to natural jus-
tice." 3 The decision in Haywood Lumber was more analytical,
46. In Estate of Geraci v. Commissioner, 502 F.2d 1148, 1149-50 (6th Cir. 1974), cert
denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975), the court intimated that it affirmed the Tax Court's decision for
the government only because of the constraints of the "clearly erroneous" rule.
47. See B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS § 8.25 (4th ed. 1979); I.R.C. §§ 543, 545, 547 (1982 & West Supp.
1984).
48. See I.R.C. § 6033 (1982 & West Supp. 1984).
49. See id. § 6015 (1982 & West Supp. 1984).
50. Haywood Lumber, 178 F.2d at 771; Orient Inv. & Fin. Co., 166 F.2d at 603. On
occasion the government has argued that the taxpayer should be penalized because he did not
ask that a particular return be prepared. For example, in Haywood Lumber the taxpayer did
not specifically ask that a personal holding company return be prepared, and in Lasater v.
United States, 48 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 148,485 (N.D. Ill. 1981), the taxpayers did not ask
specifically about the gift tax ramifications of a transaction. Rejecting the government's argu-
ment, the courts pointed out that the whole purpose behind consulting a tax expert is to learn
of a transaction's tax ramifications. Haywood Lumber, 178 F.2d at 771; Lasater, 48
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 81-6291. To require a layman to inquire of the tax expert whether a
particular return is due would defeat the reasons for consultations with experts. It is suffi-
cient that the taxpayer ask that proper returns be filed. Haywood Lumber, 178 F.2d at 771;
Lasater, 48 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 81-6291.
51. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
52. 162 F.2d at 634.
53. 166 F.2d at 603.
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holding that the standard of care imposed by the statute was per-
sonal to the taxpayer.54 The court stated that imputing the mis-
takes of the adviser to the taxpayer penalized him for consulting the
adviser because he then would be held to the adviser's higher stan-
dard of care.55
Some taxpayers have not avoided the section 6651(a)(1) penalty
simply by showing their reliance on their tax adviser's decisions. In
these cases, the taxpayers typically failed :to meet their burden of
proof.56 Taxpayers lose if they fail to show that they consulted a
tax adviser,57 or disclosed all pertinent information.5 8 They also
lose if special circumstances should have put them on notice of the
need to ask more probing questions, 9 or if they fail to show that
they relied on an expert.' Requiring the taxpayer to meet the bur-
den of proof is not a rejection of the underlying rationale of Hay-
wood Lumber.
B. The Taxpayer Neither Files nor Consults a Tax Adviser
Taxpayers who neither file returns nor consult tax advisers are
unsuccessful when they argue that they did not know a return was
required. When taxpayers fail to seek professional tax advice, the
courts are unsympathetic to their contentions that their subjective
lack of knowledge excuses them from the penalty. Rather, courts
hold taxpayers to an objective standard, stating that ignorance of
the law is no excuse.6" Underlying these decisions is a judicial per-
ception that a taxpayer who fails to consult an adviser is proceeding
54. 178 F.2d at 771.
55. Id.
56. See infra notes 57-60.
57. Manning v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1980); Coates v. Commissioner,
234 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1956); Cedarburg Canning Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 526 (7th
Cir. 1945); Yale Ave. Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 1062 (1972); Friend v. Commissioner,
20 T.C.M. (CCH) 858 (1961).
58. Estate of DeNiro v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 981 (1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 54 A.F.T.R2d (P-H) 84-5387 (6th Cir. 1984); Yale Ave. Corp. v. Commissioner,
58 T.C. 1062 (1972); Irby v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1166 (1958); see Goff v. Commissioner,
37 T.C.M. (CCH) 199 (1978); Victorson v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1238 (1962);
Kaltreider v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1958); Ely v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.M.
(CCH) 422 (1958).
59. Coates v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1956).
60. See Estate of DeNiro, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) at 988; House of Eire, Inc. v. Commissioner,
20 T.C.M. (CCH) 713, 723 (1961); Ely v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 743, 757 (1960);
Bates v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 47, 59 (1956); Vodantis v. Commissioner, 13
T.C.M. (CCH) 45, 50 (1954).
61. Picard v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 955, 961 (1957); Fischer v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.
102, 104 (1955); Joyce v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 13, 15 (1955).
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at his own risk.62 Thus, a taxpayer who makes an incorrect, unedu-
cated guess cannot avoid liability.
6 3
Estate tax returns present some additional considerations. Be-
cause most taxpayers are more knowledgeable about income taxes
than estate taxes, a taxpayer's assertion that he did not know that
an estate tax return had to be filed is more plausible than the same
statement regarding an income tax return.' In addition, an indi-
vidual is likely to know more about his own income tax return than
he is about someone else's estate tax return. If an individual has
taxable income other than salary, dividends, and interest, it is prob-
able that the additional income is attributable to some business or
investment activity. A taxpayer with this type of income is likely to
have at least some business, financial, and tax awareness. In con-
trast, an executor often is chosen because he is a friend or relative of
the decedent, not because he possesses any particular business
knowledge.65 Further, even if he is relatively sophisticated about
his own affairs, he may have only limited knowledge of the dece-
dent's business affairs.
Given this disparity of knowledge, courts could justify holding
executors to a lesser standard than is imposed for the filing of in-
come tax returns. However, nearly all courts that have considered
the penalty issue have imposed liability on executors who lacked
subjective awareness that estate tax returns had to be filed. 6 For
example, in Pfeiffer v. United States,67 the court observed that the
executrix voluntarily assumed her position and received a commis-
sion for fulfilling her obligations.68 The court concluded that mere
acceptance of the job obligated the executrix to ascertain her obliga-
tions and to exercise at least minimal supervision.69 In Daley v.
United States,7° the court followed Pfeiffer, stating that "[t]he ab-
62. See supra note 61.
63. Fischer v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 102 (1955); Wilkinson v. Commissioner, 44
T.C.M. (CCH) 614 (1982); Hendrich v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 997 (1980); Cow-
den v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1528 (1965); see Adamson v. Commissioner, 745
F.2d 541, 548 (9th Cir. 1984). But see Economy Say. & Loan Co. v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d
472 (6th Cir. 1946); Alba v. United States, 47 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) % 81-446 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
64. Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211, 214 (7th Cir. 1979) (taxpayers generally
have more knowledge about due dates for income tax returns than for estate tax returns
because of the extensive media coverage that the income tax deadline receives).
65. See, e.g., Geisen v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Wis. 1973) (physician,
without knowledge of business practices, appointed executor of his mother's estate).
66. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
67. 315 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
68. Id. at 396.
69. Id.
70. 480 F. Supp. 808 (D.N.D. 1979).
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sence of actual knowledge. . . even of the fact that a return is re-
quired to be filed does not. . . constitute reasonable cause."71 The
Tax Court consistently has held that an executor's ignorance of the
need to file a return does not excuse him from the section 665 1(a)(1)
penalty,72 because he has a positive obligation to ascertain his
duties.73
It is apparent that courts are sympathetic to taxpayers who con-
sult advisers,74 even if the advice received is incorrect. Courts dis-
play a different attitude toward taxpayers who err after not seeking
guidance.75
71. Id. at 812. While most cases support an objective standard, the courts are not unan-
imous. In Clum v. United States, 424 F. Supp. 2 (S.D. Ohio 1976), the court held in favor of
a 60-year-old executor, a farmer with a high school education but no business experience. Id.
at 3. The executor did not know of his obligation to file a return or to pay federal estate taxes
until after the due date passed. Id. The court considered the late filing as not having been the
fault of the executor, and found that in view of his age, education, and prior experience, he
had exercised ordinary business care and prudence in relying solely on his attorney. Id. at 4.
Cluin cannot be reconciled with the decisions cited supra notes 67-70, and infra note 72. It
also cannot be reconciled with other Sixth Circuit decisions.
In Cronin's Estate v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1947), the executrix at-
tempted to avoid the late filing penalty by demonstrating that her attorney was unaware of
the filing deadline. The court rejected this, stating that "[i]t is easy to see what abuses would
result if the time limit provision could, in every case, be escaped merely by the assertion that
the taxpayer or his counsel was not aware of the limitation." Id. at 566. In Estate of Geraci
v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 424 (1973), affid, 502 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975), the Tax Court relied on Cronin's Estate when penalizing an
executrix who took no steps to see that a new attorney was assigned the task of completing
the estate tax return after the estate's previous attorney had become incapacitated. The exec-
utrix's difficulty was compounded by her failure to procure an extension of time for filing.
The court noted that the record did not reflect whether she had actual knowledge that an
estate tax return had been required. However, given the size of the estate, the court con-
cluded that she either had or should have had that knowledge, and that in any event, lack of
knowledge that a return was required was not reasonable cause for missing the filing deadline.
Geraci, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) at 426. The Sixth Circuit stated that the Tax Court's criticism of
the executrix's "entirely passive role" was unjustified. Geraci, 502 F.2d at 1149.
In defense of Clum, the Sixth Circuit cases reflect considerable confusion. See infra note
230. Though the district court incorrectly decided Clum, the appellate decisions offered little
guidance as to the proper disposition of such cases. See id.
72. Estate of Lammerts v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 420, 445 (1970), affid per curiam, 456
F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1972); Estate of DiRezza v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 19, 33 (1982); Magill v.
Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 859, 872 (1982).
73. Lammerts, 54 T.C. at 445 (1970); DiRezza, 78 T.C. at 33 (1982); Estate of Rapelje v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82, 89-90 (1979); Estate of Rose v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH)
461, 464 (1973).
74. See supra notes 30-60 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
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II. THE "WHEN" CASES
A. Cases Where the Taxpayer Knows a Return is Required and
Its Due Date
Section 6651(a)(1) cases often involve a taxpayer who knows a
return must be filed but relies on his adviser to prepare the return
and comply with the deadline.16 The late filing typically occurs in
one of two circumstances. In the first, the tax adviser is aware of
the actual due date, but the filing date passes because he is busy or
forgetful. The taxpayer either knows the due date and does not
check to see that it is met, or he never inquires about the deadline.
In the second situation, the deadline may pass because the ad-
viser miscalculates the due date and believes he has more time than
actually is available. Miscalculated due dates are common in estate
tax cases because 'many tax advisers are unaware that in 1970 Con-
gress reduced the time for filing from fifteen to nine months. 77 Er-
rors in estate tax cases also occur when state law permits the filing
of state inheritance tax returns more than nine months after the
decedent's death, and the adviser mistakenly assumes that the fed-
eral deadline is the same.78 In these cases, the discovery of the error
usually does not occur until the federal deadline passes and an ex-
tension of time for filing is no longer available.79 In this situation,
additional issues arise because the taxpayer either inquires about the
deadline and receives inaccurate information, or completely fails to
make an inquiry. The confusion in several recent cases is the result
of the courts' failure to differentiate the reasons for each taxpayer's
late filing.80
Invariably, the taxpayer who knows that a return is required
76. E.g., Kroll v. United States, 547 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1977).
77. Excise, Estate, and Gift Tax Adjustment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-614, 84 Stat.
1836 (1970) (current version at I.R.C. § 6075(a) (1982)).
78. See Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211, 212-13 n. 1(7th Cir. 1979) (Indiana
law allowed 12 months for filing state inheritance tax returns); Estate of Bradley v. Commis-
sioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 70 (1974) (Kentucky inheritance tax return not due until 18 months
after the decedent's death), aff'd, 511 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1975).
79. I.R.C. § 6081(a) (1982) permits the IRS to grant an extension of up to six months
for the filing of any return. Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-1(b)(1),T.D. 7651, 1979-2 C.B. 249, provides
that a taxpayer desiring an extension shall submit an application on or before the due date of
the return. "[A] request made after the due date of the return is a nullity." M. SALTZMAN,
IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4.03[4](1981). See also Sanderling, Inc. v. Commissioner,
67 T.C. 176, 180 (1976) ("Extensions of time are neither sought nor granted for already
delinquent returns."), rev'd on other grounds, 571 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1978); Estate of Dutten-
hofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200, 203 (1967) (request for extension denied because not
mailed on or before the return due date), affid, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969).
80. See infra note 93.
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and the actual due date of that return does not avoid a penalty if his
excuse is reliance on his adviser to meet the deadline."' In response
to this argument the courts state that the taxpayer has a personal,
nondelegable duty to file the return on time,82 and that the responsi-
bility to file, imposed directly on the taxpayer by statute, cannot be
shifted to an adviser.83 Thus, while the taxpayer may delegate the
task of preparing the return, he still is responsible for the inquiry
and supervision necessary to ensure that the return is filed on time.
In this situation, if the due date is missed, the taxpayer is subject to
the penalty because his own conduct, in failing to ensure a timely
filing, is negligent.84 Imposition of the penalty results when the tax-
payer has not fulfilled his responsibilities 5 or when the excuse of-
fered is that the tax adviser has been too busy to complete the
81. Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969); cf. Estate of
Campbell v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 675 (D.N.J. 1977); Estate of Rapelje v. Commis-
sioner, 73 T.C. 82 (1979); Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 518 (1979),
affid, 638 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1980); Estate of Goff v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 199
(1978). But see Miller v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 758 (D. Wyo. 1962). The taxpayer may
be deemed negligent for failing to ensure that a timely filing has been made. As between the
taxpayer and his agent, the agent may well be required to reimburse the taxpayer for any
penalty paid. The possibility of such reimbursement does not alter the taxpayer's liability for
the penalty to the government. A taxpayer who knows a return is required by a certain due
date is not behaving prudently if he relies entirely on his agent to file on time. The responsi-
bility for the timely filing of a return known to be due rests squarely on the taxpayer. Logan
Lumber Co. v. United States, 365 F.2d 846, 854 (5th Cir. 1966).
82. United States v. Kroll, 547 F.2d 393, 396 (7th Cir. 1977); Ferrando v. United States,
245 F.2d 582, 589 (9th Cir. 1957); Daley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 808, 811 (D.N.D.
1979); Estate of Campbell v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 675, 680 (D.NJ. 1977); Richter v.
United States, 440 F. Supp. 921, 924 (D. Minn. 1977).
83. Maudlin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 749, 762 (1973); Estate of Klein v. Commis-
sioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 567, 569 (1975); see Friend v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH)
858, 866 (1961).
84. See supra note 81.
85. See, e.g., Lammerts v. Commissioner, 456 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1972) (failure to file
must be for reasonable cause and not from willful neglect); Bonvicini v. United States, 52
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 83-6427 (D. Colo. 1983) (reliance on counsel does not constitute reason-
able cause); see also Estate of DiRezza v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 19 (1982) (delegation of all
executor duties to attorney not reasonable cause); Magill v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH)
859 (1982) (delegation not reasonable cause where return fied more than five years late);
Qualley v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 887 (1976) (company's reliance on accountant
to file returns not reasonable cause); Estate of Rose v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 461
(1973) (delegation of all executor duties to attorney does not excuse duty to file return on
time); Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200 (1967) (reliance on attorney not
reasonable cause for late filing because taxpayers have reason to know a return is required);
cf. Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 463 (1979) (taxpayer must act to
see that information supplied to counsel is correct), af 'd, 638 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1981); Crapps
v. Duehay, 208 F. Supp. 344 (E.D.S.C. 1962).
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return. 86 However, in some instances, the courts even have penal-
ized taxpayers who have supervised competent tax advisers.87
Thus, the fundamental distinction between this situation and the
cases in which the taxpayer receives advice about whether to file 88 is
the taxpayer's knowledge that a return must be filed. A taxpayer
who discloses all pertinent information to a competent tax adviser
and follows the advice not to file has fulfilled his responsibilities.89
When, however, the taxpayer knows a return must be filed by a
certain date, his failure to ensure a timely filing indicates he is not
taking a known responsibility seriously.
United States v. Kroll9 ° is a critical decision in the analysis of
section 665 1(a)(1) "when" cases. In Kroll, the Seventh Circuit de-
cided that cases involving legal advice whether to file did not apply
when the taxpayer knew a return was required.9 The Kroll court
held that "when there is no question that a return must be filed, the
taxpayer has a personal, nondelegable duty to file the tax return
when due."92 This language has been quoted frequently.93 Occa-
sionally, it has been interpreted overbroadly, resulting in incorrect
conclusions. 9
4
The estate tax return in Kroll was filed ten months after its due
date.95 The executor did not inquire about the deadline until he
received notice from the IRS that the return was overdue.96 The
executor promptly contacted the estate's attorney who subsequently
promised the IRS the return would be filed within three months.97
The executor made no effort to check whether the return was fied
86. E.g., First County Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 837, 841
(D.N.J. 1968); Helvey v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 633, 640 (1956).
87. See Estate of Mayer v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1965) (per curiam)
(executor-accountant failed to exercise ordinary business care and prudence by relying on
attorney, when executor-accountant was aware that return needed to be fied), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 935 (1966). But cf., Estate of Zavesky v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1300
(1981) (reliance on counsel was reasonable where taxpayer was inexperienced in business
matters, had no knowledge that a return had to be filed and kept checking with counsel to
make certain the return was being taken care of).
88. See supra notes 21-22, 28-60 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
90. 547 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1977).
91. Id. at 396.
92. Id.
93. Boeving v. United States, 650 F.2d 493, 495 (8th Cir. 1981); Daley v. United States,
480 F. Supp. 808, 811 (D.N.D. 1979); Estate of Campbell v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 675,
680 (D.N.J. 1977); Ruel v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 1122, 1123 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
94. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
95. 547 F.2d at 394.
96. Id. at 395.
97. Id. at 395-96.
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by this date, nor did he sign the return or the check for the tax
within the three month period.98 The district court held that the
executor's reliance on the attorney was justified,99 but the Seventh
Circuit reversed and imposed the penalty."10
The court of appeals distinguished the "whether" cases, pertain-
ing to advice not to file, from those in which the taxpayer knew a
return was required. 1 ' The court's decision was based on its belief
that taxpayers know that return deadlines exist.
Any layman with the barest modicum of business experience
knows that there is a deadline for the filing of returns and knows
that he must sign the return before it is filed. If, in addition, the
taxpayer in a given case knows the exact date of the deadline,
then the failure of his attorney or accountant to present him with
98. Id. at 396.
99. Id. at 395. "No opinion, finding of fact or conclusions of law exist other than as
delivered orally by the District Court at the conclusion of the trial. . . ." Id. at 394.
100. Id. at 397.
101. 547 F.2d at 396. The court in Kroll distinguished between two separate lines of
authority. The first involved cases where the taxpayers relied upon legal advice whether or
not to file (the "whether" cases). See Commissioner v. American Ass'n of Eng'r Employ-
ment, Inc., 204 F.2d 19 (7th Cir. 1953); Cedarburg Canning Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d
526 (7th Cir. 1945); Burton Swartz Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 558 (5th Cir.
1952); Orient Inv. & Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Hatfried, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1947). The second line of authority involved cases
where taxpayers knew returns had to be filed, but relied on their tax advisers to file them on
time (the "when" cases). See Logan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 846 (5th Cir.
1966); Consolidated-Hammer Dry Plate & Film Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 829 (7th Cir.
1963); Rubber Research, Inc. v. Commissioner, 422 F.2d 1402 (8th Cir. 1970); Estate of
Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1957).
Taxpayers in the "whether" cases were held to have shown reasonable cause for their late
filings, while taxpayers in the "when" cases were penalized. The court also stated that Giesen
v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Wis. 1973), had been decided incorrectly. Giesen
involved a taxpayer who knew that a return needed to be filed and relied on his attorney to
file on time. The Giesen court, in holding for the taxpayer, relied on the cases involving
advice not to file. The Kroll court's rejection of the line of authority relied upon in Giesen
reflected a clear understanding by the Seventh Circuit that the two situations involve different
issues. In Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1979), however, the Seventh
Circuit resurrected and misapplied Giesen. See infra notes 111-18, 137-55 and accompany-
ing text.
In Kroll, reference was also made to Coates v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 459 (8th Cir.
1956). In Coates, the taxpayer failed to file a declaration of estimated tax as required by law.
Id. at 460. The taxpayer argued that the failure to file a timely declaration of estimated tax
was due to reasonable cause. Id. This argument was based on his reliance upon the advice of
a tax expert and delegation to the expert of all responsibility for preparing and filing returns.
Id. The Tax Court rejected this argument primarily because for each of the prior seven years
the taxpayer had filed a declaration of estimated tax. Id. at 462. The Tax Court had rea-
soned that since the taxpayer had fied in prior years, his failure to file for the year in question
was not attributable to reasonable cause. Further, the Tax Court found that the taxpayer and
tax adviser had never discussed whether a declaration should have been filed. Id. at 462. The
Eighth Circuit refused to disturb the Tax Court's findings and affirmed. Id. at 462-63.
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the return for his signature before that date must put him on
notice that reliance on the attorney or accountant is not an exer-
cise of ordinary business care and prudence.1
0 2
The court determined that the executor's reliance on the attorney
was not an exercise of ordinary business care and prudence once he
received actual notice from the IRS that the return was overdue.
10 3
B. The Taxpayer Knows a Return Must Be Filed and Fails to
Inquire About Its Due Date
1. Seventh Circuit Cases
Three subsequent Seventh Circuit estate tax cases have distorted
Kroll almost beyond recognition."°  In Rohrabaugh v. United
States 0 5 and Boyle v. United States,106 the Seventh Circuit held that
a taxpayer who knows a return is required has no obligation to in-
quire about its due date.l17 In the intervening decision of Fleming
v. United States, °8 the taxpayer's attorney incorrectly advised him
that he had obtained a one-year extension. 0 9 The court penalized
the taxpayer, even though he filed within the time he had been ad-
vised was available.' 10 In each of these decisions, the court focused
on the wrong issue, misapplied precedent, and reached an incorrect
conclusion.
Rohrabaugh involved both a miscalculated due date by an attor-
102. 547 F.2d at 396.
103. Id. Because the maximum penalty had accrued regardless of whether the starting
period was the due date or the day notice was received, the court expressly declined to decide
whether the executor's reliance was justified in the intervening period. Id. at 396 n.2. As the
court observed, the 25% maximum penalty can be imposed after a delay of five months. Id.
Because almost ten months had elapsed between January 9, 1969 (the date the executor
learned the return was already three months late) and October 13, 1969 (the date it was filed),
the maximum penalty could be imposed without regard to whether the taxpayer's reliance
was justified between the actual due date and the date of notice. Id.
104. The Seventh Circuit also decided Estate of Moran v. United States, 46 A.F.T.R.2d
(P-H) 148,400 (7th Cir. 1980). In Moran, the court held, in accordance with Kroll, that an
executor who is unable to file a complete estate tax return on time has "a nondelegable duty
either to request a filing extension prior to the due date or to file as complete a return as
possible on or before the due date accompanied by an explanation for the partial return." Id.
at 80-6139. Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit chose to issue Moran as an unpublished order
which was not to be cited under 7th CIR. R. 35. Id. Because 7th CIR. R. 35(c)(1)(v) provides
that the court will publish any opinion reversing an opinion reported below, the present au-
thor, who represented the United States on appeal in Moran, filed a motion asking the court
to publish its order. The motion was denied without explanation on January 22, 1980.
105. 611 F.2d 211.
106. 710 F.2d 1251, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1676 (1984).
107. 611 F.2d at 212; 710 F.2d at 1254.
108. 648 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1981).
109. Id. at 1123-24.
110. Id. at 1126-27.
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ney111 and a lack of inquiry by a taxpayer who knew that an estate
tax return was required. 12 The taxpayer-administratrix, the wid-
owed daughter of the decedent,1 13 was a high school graduate with
little experience in business matters.1 14 She retained as counsel for
the estate an attorney whom she had good reason to believe was
competent, fully disclosed all relevant information to him, and
frequently checked the progress of the probate proceedings. 15
However, the attorney filed the federal estate tax return three
months and one day late, resulting in a four-month, twenty-percent
penalty. 116
The government argued that Kroll established a per se rule that
reliance on an expert is never sufficient to constitute reasonable
cause when there was no question a return had to be filed, because
the taxpayer had a personal, nondelegable duty to file it on time.11
The Seventh Circuit, Judge Swygert dissenting, determined that
Kroll was inapplicable and resurrected a district court opinion, Gie-
sen v. United States,11 which Kroll had determined was errone-
ous.1 19 The court found for the taxpayer and in effect held that an
administratrix need not inquire about the due date of a return she
knows must be ffled.12°
In Boyle, the estate's attorney overlooked rather than miscalcu-
lated the due date. 21 The taxpayer was the executor of his
mother's estate, and twenty years earlier had served in the same
capacity for his father's estate.122 One of his responsibilities in a
111. The miscalculated due date apparently resulted either from the attorney's assump-
tion that the federal deadline was the same as the 12-month Indiana deadline (IND. CODE
§ 6-4.1-4-1 (1971) (current version at IND. CODE § 6-4.1-4-1 (1982))), or from his not realiz-
ing that the federal deadline had been shortened from 15 to 9 months. Rohrabaugh, 611 F.2d
at 212-13 n.l; see supra note 11. The decedent had died on March 25, 1976. The attorney
first realized that the federal return was overdue while working on an Indiana return on
March 24, 1977. He "freely admitted that the failure timely to file the [federal] estate tax
return was an oversight on his part." Rohrabaugh, 611 F.2d at 212-13. The attorney
promptly informed the administratrix of his error and the federal return was filed March 28,
1977. Id.




116. Id. at 213; see supra note 11.
117. Rohrabaugh, 611 F.2d at 215.
118. 369 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
119. Kroll, 547 F.2d at 397 n.3.
120. 611 F.2d at 217-19.
121. Boyle, 710 F.2d at 1252.
122. Id. at 1251.
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previous job had been to sign corporate income tax returns.123 The
executor gave the estate's attorney the necessary records and made
numerous contacts regarding the estate's progress and the return's
preparation. 124 At no time, however, did he inquire about the re-
turn's due date. Eleven weeks after the deadline, the taxpayer
learned in a telephone call that the return was overdue.125 The at-
torney explained that he had overlooked the filing date because it
mistakenly was omitted from his master calendar.' 26 The return
was filed nine days after the telephone conversation.127
Although the government argued in Boyle that the facts were
distinguishable from those in Rohrabaugh, its alternative and better
argument was that Rohrabaugh should be overruled because it was
incorrect. This full-scale attack on Rohrabaugh caused three opin-
ions to be filed in Boyle. The majority and concurring opinions em-
phasized the factual similarities between Rohrabaugh and Boyle and
rejected the attack on Rohrabaugh, because of a belief in the cor-
rectness of the case and the principle of stare decisis.128 The dissent
focused on some factual differences, but concentrated on attacking
Rohrabaugh's underlying premises and results.' 29
Although the Boyle court was controlled by the Rohrabaugh de-
cision under the principle of stare decisis, the actual departure from
that principle occurred when Rohrabaugh refused to follow Kroll.
Kroll did not expressly control Rohrabaugh because it addressed
only the situation where the taxpayer continued to rely on his attor-
ney after he had actual knowledge that the return was overdue. Be-
cause the maximum penalty had accrued both from the deadline
and the date of actual notice, the Kroll court was not required to
decide whether the taxpayer had a duty of inquiry. 1 0 The court in
Rohrabaugh therefore correctly determined that the holding in
Kroll that "when there is no question that a return must be filed,
the taxpayer had a personal, nondelegable duty to file the return
123. Id. The executor had been president of a company employing 20 people for approxi-
mately 30 years. He had signed corporate tax returns prepared by auditors and accountants
during that period. There was no evidence that a federal estate tax return had been required
from the estate of the executor's father. Id. at 1252 n.2.
124. Id. at 1252.
125. The executor's mother died on September 14, 1978, which meant the return was due
on June 14, 1979. The taxpayer learned the return was overdue on September 6, 1979 and it
was filed on September 13, 1979. Id. at 1251-52.
126. Id. at 1252-53.
127. Id. at 1258.
128. See id. at 1252-56 (concurring opinion).
129. See id. at 1256-58 (dissenting opinion).
130. See Kroll, 547 F.2d at 395-97.
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when due,""'31 was broader than warranted by the facts in that case.
The court properly rejected the government's argument that Kroll
established a per se rule that reliance on counsel can never consti-
tute reasonable cause.' 32 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit reached
the wrong result in Rohrabaugh. It later repeated its error in Boyle.
Under the Kroll rationale, the government should have won in both
of these cases.
Kroll's basic premise is that a taxpayer who knows a return
must be filed either knows, or is held responsible for knowing, that
there is a deadline for that filing. In Giesen, the Wisconsin district
court relied on cases involving advice whether to file a return to
excuse the late filing of a return which the taxpayer knew was re-
quired.' 33 Kroll held that Giesen was incorrect because the
"whether" cases were not on point when the taxpayer knew a return
was required.'34 The Rohrabaugh court departed fundamentally
from Kroll when it resurrected Giesen and accepted "whether"
cases as applicable precedent in cases when taxpayers know that
filing is required.'35
In Giesen a physician with little knowledge of business practices
was named executor of his mother's estate.136 Four years earlier he
had been executor of his father's estate. On both occasions he used
the same attorney and delegated complete control to him. 37 The
executor did, however, make frequent inquiries about the progress
of his mother's estate.' 31 He also specifically inquired about the
taxes that would have to be paid and was "told that the matter was
being handled in accordance with the law." 131 There is no indica-
tion that the executor asked about the due date, and the return was
filed more than two and one-half years late.'4°
The executor argued that reliance on his attorney constituted
reasonable cause for the failure to file, while the government con-
tended that the timely filing of a tax return was a personal, nondele-
gable duty.' In holding for the taxpayer, the district court stated
131. Id. at 396.
132. 710 F.2d at 1253.
133. 369 F. Supp. at 35-36.
134. 547 F.2d at 397 n.3.
135. 611 F.2d at 214-17.





141. Id. at 35.
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that reliance on counsel constituted reasonable cause for not filing
when three conditions were satisfied."12 These conditions were
(1) the taxpayer must be unfamiliar with tax law, (2) the taxpayer
must make full disclosure of all relevant facts to his attorney or
accountant, 143 and (3) the taxpayer must "exercise ordinary busi-
ness care and prudence."' 144
The court then stated that "[s]electing a competent tax expert,
supplying him with the necessary information, and asking him to
prepare proper returns are all that 'ordinary business care and pru-
dence' can reasonably demand."'' 45  Since the exercise of ordinary
bus;ness care and prudence is the precise definition of reasonable
cause given in the regulations accompanying section 6651(a)(1), 146
this part of the Giesen test obviously is circular. The court con-
cluded that when the three conditions were met, "the taxpayer's
good faith reliance on the advice of counsel constitutes reasonable
cause for the failure to file a timely tax return."' 47 However, the
problem with the court's analysis is that the cases cited were either
those in which the expert advised that no return was required or
ones where special circumstances had made reliance on the legal
advice unreasonable.14
8
Rohrabaugh. and Boyle subsequently adopted the three-part Gie-
sen test as the applicable standard in those cases in which the tax-
142. Id. at 36.
143. Id. at 35-36.
144. Id. at 36.
145. Id. (quoting Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769, 777
(2d Cir. 1950)).
146. See supra note 10.
147. 369 F. Supp. at 36.
148. Seven cases were cited in Giesen: Burton Swartz Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 198
F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1952); Davis v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1950); Haywood
Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1950); Orient Inv. & Fin. Co.
v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d
628 (3d Cir. 1947); Burruss Land & Lumber Co. v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 188 (W.D.
Va. 1972); and Dexter v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Miss. 1969), all of which
were cited as the first line of authority, involving legal advice whether to file. Giesen, 369 F.
Supp. at 36. Although the cases cited in Giesen supported the three-part test, the court sug-
gested no reason why those cases should apply when the taxpayer knows a return is required.
Other cases cited in Giesen involved situations where some circumstance put the taxpayer
on notice that it was not reasonable to rely on the legal advice that a return was not needed.
For example, in Educational Fund of the Elec. Indus. v. United States, 426 F.2d 1053, 1058
(2d Cir. 1970), the taxpayer, on advice of counsel, failed to withhold income taxes and file the
appropriate returns. The court imposed the penalty because the taxpayer had received an
advisory ruling from the IRS stating that it was liable for the withholding tax. Id. Indeed,
the court found that the taxpayer's conduct in failing to "file was not only imprudent, but
tantamount to 'willful neglect.'" Id. Another willful neglect case cited in Giesen was
Mayflower Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 624, 626-27 (5th Cir. 1956), where the tax-
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payer knew that a return was required and failed to inquire about
its due date.149 In addition, Rohrabaugh distinguished the "when"
cases1 50 and relied on Haywood Lumber and other cases involving
payer was held liable because the decision to not file a return was made by a layman who
never looked at the pertinent IRC provisions.
The court in Giesen also cited Rubber Research, Inc. v. Commissioner, 422 F.2d 1402
(8th Cir. 1970), and Estate of Mayer v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 403 (1964), af'd per curiam,
351 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966). In Rubber Research, reason-
able cause was found not to exist when the taxpayer was unable to produce evidence that he
received advice concerning whether to file. 422 F.2d at 1407. Rather, the taxpayer asserted
that it was his own opinion that no tax was due. Id. In Mayer, the executor was a certified
public accountant who was familiar with state and federal income taxes. 351 F.2d at 617.
Although he had only limited experience with federal estate taxes, he knew that returns have
deadlines and that penalties may result from late filing. Id. at 617-18. The executor also
signed a document that contained information about the filing deadline on its face. Id. at 617.
This knowledge and experience on the executor's part was sufficient to hold him liable for the
penalty, even though the estate's attorney miscalculated the due date. Finally, the Giesen
court cited Fisk v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 358, 359-60 (6th Cir. 1953), where the executor
was not penalized for late filing because the estate's attorney miscalculated the date on which
the return should have been mailed. See infra note 230. All of the cases cited in Giesen were
decided correctly. None of them, however, support Giesen's implied decision that a taxpayer
need not inquire about the deadline of a return known to be required.
149. See Rohrabaugh, 611 F.2d at 216-17; Boyle, 710 F.2d at 1242-54.
150. The court, noting the executrix's lack of business experience, distinguished Fer-
rando v. United States, 245 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1957), and Estate of Campbell v. United
States, 449 F. Supp. 675 (D.N.J. 1977), as involving "more sophisticated taxpayers." 611
F.2d at 217. The coexecutors in Ferrando were a mother and son who had had no prior
experience as executors. The mother had completed the eighth grade and the son had not
completed high school, although he had worked as a businessman for 15 years. 245 F.2d at
585. The executors in Campbell also were unfamiliar with estate tax laws, but one of them
was a businessman. 449 F. Supp. at 681. As both courts observed, businessmen know that
tax returns have deadlines. Ferrando, 245 F.2d at 586; Campbell, 449 F. Supp. at 681.
Rohrabaugh also distinguished Millette & Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 594 F.2d 121
(5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979). The corporate taxpayer in Millette
failed to file a consolidated return for 1972. 594 F.2d at 123. The corporation's president
claimed he had not known about the filing deadline and had relied on an accountant to file
the return on time. Id. at 124. The Fifth Circuit imposed a late filing penalty, observing that
the responsibility to ensure a timely filing belonged to the taxpayer. Id. at 124-25. The
Rohrabaugh court distinguished Millette on the ground that it was more reasonable for an
inexperienced executrix without business experience to rely on her lawyer to file an estate tax
return when she did not know its deadline than for the president of a corporate taxpayer to
rely on the corporation's accountants. 611 F.2d at 218. Although the taxpayers' experience
did differ in the two cases, Millette cannot fairly be read as a case where the taxpayer did not
know the due date. It is more likely that the president of the company simply forgot to file
the return, as there was testimony to the effect that the accountant had prepared the return
and forwarded it to the taxpayer for signature and filing. 594 F.2d at 123.
Even assuming that the taxpayers in Ferrando, Campbell, and Millette were more sophis-
ticated than the executrix in Rohrabaugh, the Seventh Circuit's decision was incorrect. De-
spite the Rohrabaugh executrix's lack of sophistication, the better view would have been to
hold the taxpayer to a duty of inquiry under the rationale of Kroll. See notes 101-03 and
accompanying text.
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legal advice whether to file.' 51
Despite the Kroll court's recognition of the Giesen court's fun-
damental error,'52 Rohrabaugh resurrected the Wisconsin district
court opinion in two ways, neither of which is noteworthy for its
accuracy. First, the Rohrabaugh court determined the facts to be
more analogous to Giesen than Kroll.153 This statement is only par-
tially correct.' 54  Second, the Rohrabaugh court misstated Kroll's
effect.15 5 Rohrabaugh's refusal either to follow Kroll or sit en banc
151. Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1950);
Commissioner v. American Ass'n of Eng'rs Employment, Inc., 204 F.2d 19 (7th Cir. 1953);
Fisk v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1953).
152. 547 F.2d at 397 n.3.
153. 611 F.2d at 216.
154. The court in Rohrabaugh identified several similarities between the case before it
and Giesen. First, both involved an inexperienced taxpayer with no knowledge of business
affairs or of the due date of the return. Id. Second, within a few days after the decedents'
deaths, each taxpayer employed an apparently competent attorney to prepare and file the
estate return. Id. Third, the taxpayers supplied the attorneys with the necessary information
to prepare the return, contacted the attorney concerning the progress of the proceedings and
received no notice of the delinquency. Id.
Despite these similarities, there are significant differences between the two cases. Unlike
the inexperienced executrix in Rohrabaugh, the executor in Giesen had previously served in
that capacity for his father's estate. 369 F. Supp. at 34. Presumably an estate tax return was
required of the father's estate, as the assets in that estate were substantially the same as those
in the mother's estate. See 611 F.2d at 212. Additionally, the Giesen executor filed his
mother's estate tax return nearly four years after her death, approximately 30 months after
the deadline. 369 F. Supp. at 34. More than four months had elapsed between the executor's
signing the return and filing with no explanation given for the delay, or for the earlier delay in
preparing the return. Id. This conduct resembles Kroll, 547 F.2d at 395 (10-month delay in
filing after return known to be overdue), much more closely than it resembles Rohrabaugh,
611 F.2d at 213 (return filed four days after executrix learned it was overdue).
155. The Rohrabaugh court concluded that although the third footnote in Kroll, 547 F.2d
at 397 n.3, showed the court's disapproval of Giesen, the scope of that disapproval was offset
by the second footnote in that opinion, 547 F.2d at 596 n.2, which expressly stated that the
court was not deciding whether the executor's reliance on his attorney was justified prior to
his receiving actual notice that the return was overdue. 611 F.2d at 216. The court then
added:
We regard the footnote reference in Kroll to Giesen as simply stating that to the
extent that Giesen was subject to an interpretation that reliance upon counsel for
timely filing would always constitute reasonable cause, this court did not agree. We
likewise reject a reading of Kroll as presenting a per se rule that such reliance is
never sufficient to constitute reasonable cause. In sum, we do not regard the foot-
note reference as being inconsistent with the result we reach in the present case.
611 F.2d at 217. The analysis contained in the first two sentences of this quote is not only
correct, but rather sophisticated. Kroll did reject Giesen's interpretation that reliance on
counsel always constituted reasonable cause for late filing. See 547 F.2d at 397 n.3.
Rohrabaugh correctly refused to read Kroll as presenting a per se rule that reliance on coun-
sel is never reasonable cause. 611 F.2d at 216. Regardless of its broad language about the
personal, nondelegable duty to file a return on time, Kroll's second footnote can fairly be read
only as restricting the holding to the situation where the taxpayer has actual knowledge of the
due date. See 547 F.2d at 396 n.2. However, the last sentence of the foregoing quote is
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to overrule it raises serious questions about the court's regard for
principles of stare decisis.' 56 It is equally serious that, as a matter of
policy, Kroll is right and Rohrabaugh and Boyle are wrong.
Kroll rejected Giesen for a practical, commonsense reason. As
the court in Kroll stated, "any layman with the barest modicum of
business experience knows that" there is a deadline for the filing of
returns, and that returns must be signed before they are filed.'5 7 If
a taxpayer knows the due date of a return and has not signed it
before the deadline, he no longer has reasonable cause. Kroll con-
cluded that this put the taxpayer on notice that reliance on his tax
adviser was not an exercise of ordinary business care and pru-
dence. 158 Rohrabaugh and Boyle departed from this commonsense
reasoning when they determined that taxpayers who know a return
is required have no duty to inquire as to its deadline."5 9 These deci-
sions reward ignorance,' 6° encourage postfiling perjury, 61 and are
inconsistent with the decisions of other courts.'
62
2. Other Courts and Common Sense
The Tax Court,163 the Eighth Circuit, 6  and several district
courts 65 have determined that a taxpayer has a positive obligation
to ascertain a tax return's due date. Their determination begins by
recognizing that an executor assumes various obligations.1 66 An ex-
completely wrong. Kroll's third footnote (547 F.2d at 397 n.3) was inconsistent with the
result reached in Rohrabaugh. The court in Kroll rejected the "whether" cases as appropriate
authority for the situation in which a taxpayer knew a return was required, 547 F.2d at 396,
whereas Rohrabaugh used precisely that same authority to let the taxpayer escape liability.
611 F.2d at 217. It is hard to imagine an inconsistency greater than this. Rohrabaugh cor-
rectly stated that Krolls second footnote cut down that case's scope, but that limitation in no
way weakened the Kroll court's determination that Haywood Lumber and its progeny were
inapplicable to a Rohrabaugh-Gesen type situation. 547 F.2d at 396, 397 n.3.
156. See 611 F.2d at 216-17.
157. 547 F.2d at 396.
158. Id.
159. See 710 F.2d at 1254; 611 F.2d at 219.
160. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
161. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
163. E.g. Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 518 (1979), affid, 638
F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1980); Rapelje v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82 (1979); Ferrando v. United
States, 56-2 FED. EST. & GIFr TAX REP. (CCH) 11,615 (N.D. Cal. 1956), affd, 245 F.2d
582 (9th Cir. 1957).
164. E!g., Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1980).
165. E.g., Daley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 808 (D.N.D. 1979); Pfieffer v. United
States, 315 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
166. Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200, 204 (1967), aftd, 410 F.2d 302
(6th Cir. 1969); Daley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 808, 812 (D.N.D. 1979); Pfeiffer v.
United States, 315 F. Supp. 392, 396 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
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ecutor cannot merely retain an attorney and delegate all responsibil-
ities to him. Rather, he must ascertain his obligations, 167 oversee
the attorney, 168 and act with vigilance and promptness. 169 An exec-
utor must, at a minimum, ascertain the due date of the return and
take the appropriate steps to ensure that it is filed on time.1 70 A
taxpayer who knows a return must be filed is presumed to know
there is a deadline for that return. 171 Therefore, he fails to exercise
ordinary business care and prudence if he does not ascertain the due
date. 172
The courts give four reasons why taxpayers have an obligation
to inquire about deadlines. First, Congress, not individual taxpay-
ers, decides when returns must be filed. The taxpayer who fails to
inquire about a deadline impliedly is deciding that the return will be
filed at his convenience regardless of the statutory requirements.
Such conduct can be described as naive, forgetful, careless, or insou-
ciant, but it most certainly cannot be considered an exercise of ordi-
nary business care and prudence.
Judge Posner, dissenting in Boyle, succinctly articulated this
point:
167. Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200, 204 (1967), affd per curiam,
410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969); Daley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 808, 812 (D.N.D. 1979);
Pfeiffer v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 392, 396 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
168. Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200,205 (1967), afl'd, 410 F.2d 302
(6th Cir. 1969); Estate of Mayer v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 617, 617 (2d Cir. 1965) (per
curiam), cert denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966); Daley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 808, 811
(D.N.D. 1979); Pfeiffer v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 392, 396 (E.D. Cal. 1970); Ferrando v.
United States, 56-2 FED. EST. & GIFT TAX REP. (CCH) 111,615 (N.D. Cal. 1956), afid, 245
F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1957).
169. Daley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 808, 812 (D.N.D. 1979); see Ferrando v.
United States, 245 F.2d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 1957).
170. Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200, 205 (1967), aff'd, 410 F.2d 302
(6th Cir. 1969); Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 518, 520 (1979), affid,
638 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1981); Estate of Rapelje v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82, 89-90 (1979); see
Ferrando v. United States, 56-2 FED. EST. & GIFT TAx REP. (CCII) 111,615 (N.D. Cal.
1956), afl'd, 245 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1957).
171. Daley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 808 (D.N.D. 1979); Estate of Lillehei v. Com-
missioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 518, 520 (1979), af'd, 638 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1980); Estate of
Rapelje v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82, 89 n.7 (1979).
172. See Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200, 205 (1967), aff'd, 410 F.2d
302 (6th Cir. 1969); Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 518, 520 (1979),
afl'd, 638 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1980); Estate of Rapelje v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82, 89-90
(1979). Gray v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Mo. 1978), the one case other than
Rohrabaugh and Boyle to hold that a taxpayer need not inquire about the deadline of a re-
turn, was criticized by other courts and overruled by implication by the Eighth Circuit. See
infra notes 318-25 and accompanying text; Lillehei, 638 F.2d at 66; Daley v. United States,
480 F. Supp 808, 812 (D.N.D. 1979); Estate of Rapelje v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82, 89 n.7
(1979).
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He [the executor] knew he had to file an estate tax return for his
mother's estate, and he must have known that the return was due
within a fixed period of time after the decedent's death-that it
could not be filed whenever he took a fancy to fie it. [Citing
Kroll]. Since a reasonable man with Boyle's business experi-
ence-experience that included signing corporate income tax re-
turns for many years-would have asked his lawyer when the
return was due, Boyle cannot appeal to a statute that requires
reasonable cause for filing late.
173
Judge Posner then added:
Whatever the Boyles [the executor and his wife] were discussing
with Keyser [the attorney] in this period it was not the due date
of the estate tax return that they knew had to be filed and that
they must have known had to be filed within a fixed period of
time and not simply at their pleasure. Boyle could not simply
close his eyes and ears and still be found to have used "ordinary
business care and prudence." 17
4
The Rohrabaugh court rationalized the decision not to impose a
commonsense obligation on taxpayers by differentiating between es-
tate tax and income tax deadlines. The court found that the type of
tax involved was a factor in determining the existence of ordinary
business care and prudence. 175 A taxpayer might have considerable
difficulty demonstrating his unawareness of the April fifteenth dead-
line for filing income tax returns, "if, for no other reason than the
repeated media references to that date."' 76 In contrast, the estate
tax return deadline is a "floating" one, keyed to the death of a par-
ticular decedent. 177
Although Rohrabaugh surely is correct in assuming that the in-
come tax deadline is more familiar to most taxpayers than the dead-
line for estate tax returns, this observation does not support the
conclusion that an executor has no obligation to ascertain the estate
tax deadline. On the contrary, it reinforces the idea that an unin-
formed person has a duty of inquiry. The common ignorance of
due dates for estate tax returns by executors ought to create a duty
of inquiry, not a means to escape liability.17
173. Boyle, 710 F.2d at 1256-57.
174. Id. at 1258.
175. 611 F.2d at 214.
176. Id.
177. Id.; see supra notes 6, 11.
178. The court also observed that the treasury regulations provide that "[i]n determining
if the taxpayer exercised ordinary business care and prudence in providing for the payment of
his tax liability, consideration will be given to the nature of the tax which the taxpayer failed
to pay." Id. at 218 n.2 (quoting Treas. Reg. 301 § 6651-(c)(1), T.D. 7260, 1973-1 C.B. 590).
The example provided in the regulation states that a taxpayer's efforts to conserve assets in
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The facts of Boyle illustrate the second commonsense reason
why taxpayers must be responsible for complying with due dates. 179
As a practical matter, the taxpayer involved is more likely to re-
member the particular return's due date than his attorney. A per-
son remembers his own situation in more detail than does someone
else to whom the person is one of many. For example, a patient
who visits his physician probably has his particular symptoms
clearly in mind, while the physician almost certainly needs to con-
sult the patient's chart. Similarly, the executor who knows the due
date of the estate tax return for which he is responsible probably
keeps that date more in mind than does the attorney who is han-
dling matters for several clients.
In Boyle, the attorney's explanation for missing the due date was
that the estate was omitted from his master calender because of a
clerical error. 8 0 Even though the executor frequently contacted the
attorney to inquire about the progress of the estate, the due date
slipped by. 8' If the executor had asked specifically about the due
date, the executor's later inquiries would not have been limited to
general questions about the progress of the estate. 182 Rather, he
would have been able, during his frequent calls,' 8 3 to remind the
attorney of the exact due date. At the very least, such reminders
would have increased the likelihood that the estate would have been
listed on the attorney's master calendar; at best, the return would
have been filed on time.
A third reason for imposing a duty of inquiry on taxpayers is
that it is an easy duty to discharge.' 84 Courts that have refused to
impose the duty have misunderstood the nature of the task in-
volved.' 85 In Gray v. United States,186 the court refused to require
an inquiry because it was the lawyer's job, rather than the tax-
payer's, "to delve into the tax code and its regulations to find out
marketable form may constitute reasonable cause for nonpayment of income taxes, but not
for failure to remit tax funds which have been collected or withheld from another person
under § 7501. It is difficult to understand how this regulation somehow becomes authority
for the proposition that it is an exercise of ordinary business care and prudence not to inquire
about the deadline for a return about which the executor lacks knowledge.
179. 710 F.2d at 1251.
180. Id. at 1252.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 1252.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
186. 453 F. Supp. at 1356.
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[when the return is due]." '18 7 A duty of inquiry, however, is not a
duty of research. The duty is discharged by asking a simple ques-
tion, not by investigating the IRC. 188 The Gray court's concern is
justified if the taxpayer is expected to guarantee the accuracy of the
answer given,"8 9 but is misplaced if all that is involved is a duty of
inquiry. 1
90
Judge Coffey's concurring opinion in Boyle reflects a similar
misunderstanding of the requirements of the duty of inquiry. 191
First, the judge erred in assuming that requiring the taxpayer to
inquire about the filing date was equivalent to requiring him "to
supervise his attorney's every move, or to, in essence, personally
perform those tasks he has entrusted his professionally retained
legal counsel to complete." '92 Inquiring about a deadline is not be-
yond the capabilities of the average taxpayer. The taxpayer must
simply ask, "When is this return due?" It is a one-time' 93 task that
does not entail constant supervision of every move. Second, the
judge's objections about supervision are inconsistent with other Sev-
enth Circuit authority. 194 Third, his statement that no appellate
court "has ever held that asking a single magically worded question
(the exact due date) is the determining factor in cases such as
this," 95 albeit literally correct, actually is quite misleading. 96 Fi-
187. Id. at 1361.
188. Daley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 808, 813 (D.N.D. 1979).
189. This situation should be distinguished from that where the Seventh and Eighth Cir-
cuits erroneously determined that the taxpayer was liable for the penalty when the return was
filed late because of a miscalculated due date.
190. See Daley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 808, 813 (D.N.D. 1979).
191. 710 F.2d at 1255.
192. Id.
193. Lillehei clearly imposed a duty on the taxpayer to determine the actual due date.
Lillehel, 638 F.2d at 66. Additionally, the Daley court stated:
The absence of actual knowledge of the due date of the return or even of the fact
that a return is required to be filed does not therefore constitute reasonable cause.
In the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, an executrix is required to know that
there is a deadline for the filing of estate tax returns.
480 F. Supp. at 812.
It would seem to follow that a taxpayer's duty of inquiry should not be satisfied by his
first inquiry if the answer received is vague. Rather, he should be required to continue making
inquiry until he receives a specific due date.
194. But cf. Fleming v. United States, 648 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1981), where the Seventh
Circuit in effect did require an executor to supervise the attorney's every move. The attorney
in Fleming incorrectly told the estate's personal representative that he had obtained a one-
year extension for filing the estate tax return. Id. at 1123-24. The taxpayer filed 10 months
after the actual due date, but within the time he believed was available. Id. at 1124. He was
penalized because he had not asked for documentary proof of the extension, but instead had
relied on the oral assurance it had been obtained. See id. at 1125-26.
195. 710 F.2d at 1255.
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nally, the policy justification for requiring the taxpayer to ask a
"magically worded question" '197 is the desire to ensure compliance
with statutory deadlines.
In a cogently reasoned opinion, the court in Daley v. United
States19 gives the fourth reason for imposing a duty of inquiry.
The court noted that the opposite rule would undermine the effec-
tiveness of the tax laws by encouraging taxpayers to remain unin-
formed.19 9 In Boyle, the government put forth this rationale,
maintaining that Rohrabaugh was incorrect because it encouraged
executors to remain ignorant of filing deadlines.2c° The government
also argued that an attorney "may well avoid giving such informa-
tion even where the executor does make an inquiry, since it would
be not only in the estate's best interest but also in the attorney's own
interest to keep the executor uninformed of this crucial matter."' '
The Boyle court, -however, rejected both these arguments. Execu-
tors, the court stated, had no motive to remain ignorant of deadlines
to avoid penalties for late filings, because they could obtain exten-
sions of time to file.202 Further, since Rohrabaugh adopted a case-
by-case analysis, the Boyle court determined that an executor would
be foolish to assume he would obtain judicial relief2 03 For the same
reasons, the Boyle court noted that attorneys would not knowingly
withhold information from their clients.2°
A proper analysis of the Boyle decision results in the conclusion
that the government's argument and the court's response are out of
focus. On one level, the government's argument is correct. The
effect of Rohrabaugh, Boyle, and Fleming v. United States2 °5 is that
the taxpayer who asks about a due date is held liable if the return is
filed late, even if he was misinformed. If he does not ask, however,
he escapes liability. Thus, the taxpayer can be penalized if he seeks
information, but escapes liability if he fails to make any inquiry
196. The Eighth Circuit, in Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 65 (8th Cir.
1981), did not expressly require that the taxpayer inquire about the return's due date. The
Tax Court opinion in Lillehei contained such a requirement, however, and the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court's decision "on the basis of that court's opinion." Id. at 66; see Lillehei
v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CC) 518, 519-52 (1979), aff'd, 638 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1981).
197. Boyle, 710 F.2d at 1255.
198. 480 F. Supp. 808, 813 (D.N.D. 1979).
199. Id.




204. Id. at 1253-54.
205. 648 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1981).
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whatsoever as to the due date. The Seventh Circuit has not, and
undoubtedly cannot, offer a convincing rationale for this absurd
result.
The government erred, however, when it argued that the practi-
cal effect of Rohrabaugh and Boyle was to encourage a deliberate
strategy of prefiling ignorance.20 6 The typical nonprofessional exec-
utor does not deliberately choose in advance not to inquire about a
deadline in order to avoid a penalty because he is probably unaware
that the penalty provision exists.2"7 If he does know about the pen-
alty provision, he probably will act to avoid it.20
Similarly, most tax advisers do not decide in advance to keep
their clients ignorant. Although Rohrabaugh is a flawed opinion,
the court accurately observed that a number of factors militate
against the late filing of returns.20 9 These include the adviser's em-
barrassment in having to admit to his client that he failed to make a
timely filing, delays in settling estates, possible litigation costs, and
interest on the late tax.2 1a Given these factors, it would be rare that
an adviser would deliberately decide in advance to file late, and then
act to guard against a penalty by not informing his client of the
deadline.
The most significant concern these cases raise is their possible
effect on postfiling conduct. Although Rohrabaugh and Boyle offer
only limited encouragement to file late deliberately, they serve as
enormous incentives to commit perjury.2 1 Once the due date has
passed and the taxpayer learns from the IRS that the return is late,
the attorney frantically will research ways to avoid the penalty. He
quickly will learn that if he and his client attest that the taxpayer
never inquired about the due date, the taxpayer can escape the
penalty. 212
Because an adviser is subject only to derivative liability,213 he
escapes the penalty if the taxpayer does. As Judge Posner noted in
his Boyle dissent, this state of affairs creates "enormous pressure"
for negligent attorneys to make "desperately self-serving declara-
tions" about their conduct.214 Even if Rohrabaugh and Boyle do
206. Boyle, 710 F.2d at 1253.
207. See supra note 11.
208. Id.
209. 611 F.2d at 219.
210. Id.
211. See 710 F.2d at 1258.
212. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 398-408.
214. 710 F.2d at 1258. These comments are not intended to suggest that the attorney in
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not encourage prefiling ignorance, they reward that ignorance later
and also encourage perjury.
Ill. RETURNS FILED LATE BECAUSE THE ADVISER
MISCALCULATED THE DUE DATE
A. The Hybrid Cases: An Overview of the Issues and Decisions
The principal remaining issue in section 6651(a)(1) cases in-
volves returns that are filed late because an attorney or accountant
miscalculated the due date.21 The typical result of a miscalculation
is that the taxpayer files his return after the actual deadline, but
within the time he believed was available. Today, the greatest area
of controversy in late filing cases is whether the penalty should be
imposed in these.circumstances. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits
impose the penalty, while the Tax Court and Third Circuit do
not.216
This controversy results from a fundamental disagreement over
applicable precedent. A taxpayer who knows a return must be fied
but is misadvised as to its due date is in a situation that is not con-
trolled directly by either the "whether" or "when" authorities pre-
viously discussed.21 7 Because the taxpayer knows a return must be
filed, the cases involving legal advice as to whether a return should
be filed are not directly on point.21 8 On the other hand, there are
difficulties in using the "when" cases as applicable precedent. Su-
perficially, the cases pertaining to a taxpayer's personal, nondelega-
ble duty to file a timely return known to be required 219 seem
directly applicable. But those cases involve the situation of a tax-
payer who knows that a return is required and its actual due date.
That is very different from the situation in which a taxpayer who
knows he must file receives erroneous advice about the deadline.
Ideally, a court presented with a case in which the taxpayer re-
ceived erroneous advice as to when to file would undertake a two-
step analysis. First, it would recognize that neither the "whether"
Boyle acted improperly. Cf. Boyle, 710 F.2d at 1255-56. In general, however, the Boyle rule
does encourage perjury.
215. Typically, the tax adviser either confuses the federal deadline with a longer state
deadline, or thinks the old 15-month federal deadline is still applicable. See supra notes
77-78.
216. See infra notes 221-307 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 30-156 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 30-72 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 77-156 and accompanying text.
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nor "when" authority is directly on point.22 ° Second, after examin-
ing the policies underlying the two types of cases, the court would
analogize to the "whether" cases as the more appropriate authority.
The case which comes closest to this ideal analysis is Estate of Brad-
ley v. Commissioner,221 in which the Tax Court decided that cases
involving advice on when to file should be treated identically to
cases involving whether to file.2 2  The Third Circuit, in Sanderling
v. Commissioner,223 also reached this result, although its reasoning
and precedential value are less clear than that of Bradley.224 The
decisions which are farthest from the ideal are those of the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits, in which the courts incorrectly decided that a
taxpayer proceeds at his own risk by accepting advice about dead-
lines.225 The Seventh Circuit, in Fleming v. United States,226 held
for the government by distorting the facts and adopting an errone-
ous legal theory of imputation of negligence.227 The Eighth Circuit
did not attempt to fashion a theory to support its conclusion.
Rather, in both Smith v. United States22 ' and Estate of Kerber v.
United States,229 the Eighth Circuit imposed the penalty without
any analysis or indication that different facts might warrant differ-
ent results.
B. Cases for the Taxpayer
Estate of Bradley v. Commissioner,23' a Tax Court memoran-
220. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
221. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 70 (1974), a.fd, 511 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1975).
222. Id. at 73.
223. 571 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1978).
224. In Sanderling, the court's decision was probably influenced by the confusion of the
IRS itself about the due date.
225. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
226. 648 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1981).
227. Id. at 1125-27.
228. 702 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1983).
229. 717 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1983).
230. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 70 (1974), affid, 511 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1975) (affirming in a brief
one-paragraph order). The Sixth Circuit affirmed Bradley for the reasons stated in the Tax
Court's opinion. It has frequently shifted positions on the issue of proper treatment of those
cases in which a taxpayer knows a return must be filed, but is misadvised as to its deadline. It
is difficult to tell whether the decision in Bradley is definitive, so it will be treated as Tax
Court rather than Sixth Circuit authority.
In Fisk v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1953), rev'g 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 77 (1952),
the Sixth Circuit held in favor of an executor who fied an estate tax return one day late. The
return which was due on July 21, 1947, was mailed that day and was received by the IRS the
following day. In reversing the Tax Court, the Sixth Circuit held that reliance on an attorney
to file a return would be treated as reasonable cause for late filing. 203 F.2d at 359-60. The
court equated this type of reliance with reliance on an attorney for legal advice. Id. at 360
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dum decision affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, is the definitive case
(citing Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1950)). See
supra notes 54-60 for a discussion of Haywood Lumber.
In a later decision, Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969)
(per curiam), the Sixth Circuit distinguished Fisk on the ground that it involved only a one-
day delay, unlike the five-month delay in Duttenhofer. 410 F.2d at 302. Although Fisk and
Duttenhofer did involve significantly different periods of delay, the court's stated reason for
distinguishing them obscured a more important difference. The more meaningful way to
distinguish the cases is to recognize that the former was a legal advice case, while the latter
involved a return known by the taxpayer to be required. See infra notes 242-45 and accom-
panying text.
In Estate of Geraci v. Commissioner, 502 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1974), aft'g 32 T.C.M.
(CCH) 424 (1973), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975), the Sixth Circuit apparently retreated
from its holding in Fisk that a taxpayer may rely on his attorney for legal advice about
deadlines. The executrix in Geraci proffered three reasons for her late filing: (1) she relied
entirely on the attorney to file the return; (2) the attorney was incapacitated by illness when
the return was due; and (3) the attorney miscalculated the due date.
The Tax Court had sustained a 15% penalty, finding that "the executrix played an en-
tirely passive role." Geraci, 32 T.C.M. (CCII) at 426. The court held that the executrix had
an obligation to see that the return was filed. Id. She relied entirely on the attorney, did not
seek an extension, and made no effort to have the return assigned to another attorney when
the estate's lawyer became incapacitated. See id. As to the miscalculated due date, the court
cryptically remarked that it "must fail for the same reason as the first." Id. In other words,
the court apparently determined that the obligation to ascertain the due date meant not mak-
ing merely an inquiry as to the deadline, but ensuring that the answer given by the attorney
was accurate.
This determination is inconsistent with the court's later decision in Bradley, 33 T.C.M.
(CCH) 70. See infra notes 235-45 and accompanying text. The inconsistency probably is
attributable to the issue of a miscalculated due date being more oblique in Geraci than in
Bradley. The Tax Court correctly viewed the executrix's conduct in Geraci as being entirely
passive. 32 T.C.M. (CCH) at 42. Although the Sixth Circuit disagreed with this characteri-
zation, Geraci, 502 F.2d at 1149, this view cannot be sustained in light of the executrix's own
claim that she relied entirely on her attorney. Geraci, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) at 426. Geraci also
is inconsistent with the district court's opinion in Clum v. United States, 424 F. Supp. 2
(S.D. Ohio 1976). There the court held for the executor, a sixty-year-old farmer with a high
school education, who relied completely on his attorney to administer the estate. Id. at 3. In
fact, the executor did not know he had to file a return until more than nine months after his
sister's death. Id. The court cited Fisk, Geraci, and Duttenhofer that reliance upon an attor-
ney to give correct advice and administer the legal obligations of the estate is reasonable. Id.
at 4. It went on to cite Giesen for the elements of good cause within the meaning of§ 6651.
Id. The executor "acted reasonably and had no greater duty." Id.
The Sixth Circuit in Bradley had the opportunity to clarify its reading of Fisk and the
unresolved issues in Geraci. Instead, it affirmed in a one-paragraph opinion "for the reasons
set forth" by the Tax Court. Bradley, 511 F.2d at 528. This cryptic treatment of legal advice
issues is unfortunate, because it leaves the court's views somewhat uncertain. See Bank of
Benton v. United States, 84-2 FED. EsT. & GIFr TAX REP. (CCH) 13,582 (W.D. Ky. 1984).
Sixth Circuit precedent, when viewed as a whole, probably supports the proposition that a
taxpayer may rely on his attorney's advice about deadlines, even though that advice is sub-
stantively erroneous, as long as he files within the time he is advised is available. The pres-
ence of Geraci and the brief affirmance in Bradley, however, makes it only a probability, and
not a certainty, that this proposition is indeed the Sixth Circuit's view. The district court in
Benton followed this view, stating that "there are strong indications that. . . reliance upon
advice of counsel, under proper circumstances, can constitute reasonable cause for delayed
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permitting taxpayers to rely on erroneous advice concerning a re-
turn deadline. In that case, an estate's accountant incorrectly ad-
vised the coexecutor, an attorney and son-in-law of the decedent,
that he had eighteen months in which to file.231  The coexecutor
filed the return after the actual fifteen-month deadline, but before
the eighteen-month period had elapsed.2 32 Because of the late filing,
the government opposed the coexecutor's election of the alternate
valuation date permitted by section 2032.233 It also sought the late
filing penalty. 3a
In an excellent opinion, the court drew a sharp distinction be-
tween sections 2032 and 6651, based upon the absence and pres-
ence, respectively, of reasonable cause language in the two Code
filing of an estate tax return." Benton, 84-2 FED. Esr. & GIFr TAx REP. (CCII) 13,582, at
18,248. The bank-executor knew that a return was required but did not know if or when
there was a deadline. Id. at 18,247. It relied on its attorney to handle the legal aspects of the
estate and accepted his erroneous advice. Id. Consequently, the return was not filed within
the time constraints. Id. The court looked to the bank's status and its knowledge that a
return was required and held that it had unreasonably relied on its attorney to make a timely
filing. Id. at 18,248.
231. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 70.
232. The decedent in Bradley died on January 30, 1969. Id. Under then-applicable law,
the federal estate tax return was due within 15 months of the decedent's death, or by April
30, 1970. Id. The Kentucky state inheritance tax return was due 18 months after the date of
death, or by July 30, 1970. Id. Before either return was due, the coexecutor asked the es-
tate's accountant about the due date. Id. The accountant thought the inquiry related to the
Kentucky state return and replied that it was due in 18 months. Id. The return was filed on
May 28, 1970. Id.
The government argued in part that the late filing penalty should be levied because one of
the coexecutors, Joseph L. Arnold, was an attorney. Id. at 72. The court stated that though
an attorney's reliance upon an accountant's advice concerning deadlines is usually unjustifi-
able, Mr. Arnold had demonstrated that his law practice did not include tax work. Id. at
72-73. Indeed, for at least the preceding 20 years, Mr. Arnold had entrusted his own, his law
firm's, and his clients' tax work to the accounting firm involved in this litigation. Id. at 73.
That firm earlier had handled the estate tax return of Mr. Arnold's father-in-law, who had
died in 1947. Id. In fact, the two Bradley estates were the only ones in which Mr. Arnold
had ever served as executor, and in both instances the accounting firm had prepared and filed
the returns. Id. Given this evidence, the court's conclusion that the attorney justifiably relied
upon the accountant's advice is correct. The opinion does not discuss the extent of the other
coexecutor's knowledge, apparently because Mr. Arnold handled all matters for them both.
Id. at 70.
233. I.R.C. § 2032 (1982) amended by Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,
§§ 1023-1024, 84 Stat. 494, 1030 (1984) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2032(c)-(d)). The alter-
nate valuation method allows the executor or administrator to choose to have the estate val-
ued either at the date of decedent's death or six months afterwards. The alternate valuation
method must be elected; it is not automatic. Id. Further, it may be elected only if the gross
estate at the date of death is greater than $60,000, the amount for which an estate tax return
must be filed pursuant to § 6018. I.R.C. § 6018 (1982).
234. 33 T.C.M. (CCII) at 72.
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23provisions. Section 2032(c) provided that an executor may only
make the alternate valuation election "on his return if fied within
the time prescribed by law or before the expiration of any extension
of time granted pursuant to law for the filing of the return. '2 36 The
accompanying regulation contains the express provision that "[i]n
no case may the election be exercised, or a previous election
changed, after the expiration"2 37 of the time for filing, including ex-
tensions. The court adopted the government's contention that this
express statutory and regulatory language precluded the coexecutor
from making the alternate valuation election, even if the late filing
was due to reasonable cause.23 8
On the section 6651 penalty issue, the court held for the tax-
payer.2 39 The court stated that the coexecutor's reliance upon the
accountant's advice was consistent with ordinary business care and
prudence.' ° The government's response began with the premise
that since the coexecutor knew the return was required, he had a
personal, nondelegable duty to file the return on time.24 1 Relying
235. Id. at 71.
236. I.R.C. § 2032(c) (1982), amended by Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
369, §§ 1023-1024, 84 Stat. 494, 1030 (1984) to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2032(c)-(d). Subsec-
tion (c) has been redesignated as subsection (d) and now states that an alternate valuation is
irrevocable once made and that the election cannot be made if the return is filed more than
one year after the prescribed deadline. Id.
237. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1, T.D. 7238, 1973-1 C.B. 544, 549.
238. 33 T.C.M. at 71-72. It is well-settled, both under the regulations and in judicial
decisions, that no election of the alternate valuation may be made on an untimely filed return.
For example, in Flinchbaugh v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 653 (1943), the estate tax return was
filed two days late. Id. at 654. The Tax Court denied effect to the election because the
alternate valuation election was a matter of legislative grace, and it "must be made in the
manner and in the time prescribed by Congress." Id. at 655. More recently, the court in
Crissey v. United States, 45 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1148,384 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), also held that the
opportunity to choose the alternate valuation date was not available after the return was due.
In Crissey, the return was filed 18 days late. Id. at 80-1755. Almost one year later, the
taxpayer requested an extension of time to file an estate tax return. Id. Had her application
been granted, the option to elect the alternate valuation date would have been available. Id.
This request subsequently was denied. Id. The taxpayer argued that the denial of her appli-
cation for an extension constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. The court, though sympa-
thetic to the taxpayer, held that the election of the alternate valuation date was "a matter of
legislative grace to be taken advantage of in accord with statutory requirements." Id. at 80-
1756 (citing J.E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 55 (1940)). See also Carmean v.
United States, 84-1 FED. EST. & GIF TAx REP. (CCH) 113,551 (Ct. Cl. 1984); Rosenfield
v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 780, 783-84 (E.D. Pa. 1957) ("If by mistake the election is not
properly made within the permitted time, hardship and equities will not be considered in
determining whether an election can be permitted after the time has expired."), affid, 254
F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1958).
239. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 73.
240. Id.
241. Id. The government cited Ferrando v. United States, 245 F.2d 582, 589 (9th Cir.
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on Duttenhofer v. Commissioner,242 the government then argued
that although erroneous advice whether a return needs to be filed
may be reasonable cause for failure to file such a return, such advice
is not reasonable cause for failing to timely fie a return known to be
due.243 The Tax Court emphatically rejected the government's ar-
gument, stating:
To sustain respondent's [the government's] argument would re-
quire a holding that an executor may rely upon the advice of an
expert on substantive tax law questions but, as a matter of law,
may not do so with respect to the requirements of the law as to
the due date of tax returns-that he must research that question
for himself. We decline to so hold. We fail to see a significant
distinction between the reasonableness of a failure to file at all
and the reasonableness of a failure to file on time, where in both
circumstances the taxpayer has relied on the advice of competent
counsel. 2
1957). Ferrando is an older case establishing the "when" authority, and was relied upon by
the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Kroll, 547 F.2d 393, 397 (7th Cir. 1977).
242. 49 T.C. 200 (1967), affid per curiam, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969). In analyzing
Bradley, it is instructive to look at Duttenhofer to determine why the Bradley court found it
to be distinguishable rather than controlling. There is language in the Tax Court's opinion in
Duttenhofer that could, on initial reading, be interpreted as inconsistent with Bradley. The
attorney for the coexecutors in Duttenhofer fied the estate tax return more than five months
late. 49 T.C. at 203. The coexecutors argued that their reliance on the tax attorney to pre-
pare and file the tax return properly constituted reasonable cause for the late filing as a matter
of law, analogizing cases from the "whether" line of authority. Id. at 205. Rejecting those
cases as inapplicable, the Tax Court stressed that they had involved taxpayers who did not
know that certain returns were required. Id. The court observed that the sole issue in Dut-
tenhofer revolved around the return's due date rather than whether it was due at all. Id. at
206. The court held that "[tihis case only involves a question of calendar dates and we do
not think that because the petitioners, knowing a return had to be fied, relied on an attorney,
competent or not, to file the return, excuses late filing." Id. It was stressed throughout the
opinion that the "whether" line of cases involved only cases where the taxpayer had relied
upon counsel's advice that a return was not required. This rule helps to explain the govern-
ment's argument that the "whether" authority is inapplicable where the taxpayer admittedly
knows a return is necessary. See id. at 205-07.
A more careful reading of Duttenhofer reveals that it is distinguishable from Bradley.
Although the taxpayers in both cases knew that an estate tax return was required, the similar-
ity ends there. The coexecutor in Bradley specifically inquired as to the due date and acted in
accordance with the information he received. See 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 72-73. However, the
co-executors in Duttenhofer took a quite different approach. They knew that a return was
required but made no effort to ascertain its due date; instead, they "practically abdicated their
responsibilities" for the estate to the attorney and "blindly acquiesced" in his decisions. 49
T.C. at 204. Bradley involved misinformation being given in response to a specific inquiry,
while Duttenhofer involved a complete lack of inquiry and very minimal supervision.
Although the government correctly prevailed in Duttenhofer, Bradley properly rejected Dut-
tenhofer's language that calendar dates control in a situation where those dates were indeed in
issue. Id. at 205.
243. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 73.
244. Id.
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The court concluded that the coexecutor had acted in good faith in
determining the due date and that he had demonstrated reasonable
cause for the late filing.245
An interesting extension of Bradley occurred in Estate of
DiPalma v. Commissioner," a 1978 Tax Court decision in which
the IRS acquiesced.247 The executrix in DiPalma, Constance Sava-
rese, was one of six children of the decedent.248 Although the estate
tax return was due on December 14, 1970, it was not filed until June
19, 1973.249 The delay in filing resulted from a will contest; the
decedent had disinherited one of her other children, Florence Guer-
cio, who possessed all the securities owned by the decedent which
comprised the bulk of the estate.250 Mrs. Guercio disputed her ex-
clusion from the estate, refused to turn over the securities, and ulti-
mately resorted to litigation.251 In January 1973, the dispute was
settled between the children, with Mrs. Guercio receiving a cash
payment.252
Mrs. Savarese, as executrix, engaged in several conversations
with the estate's attorney regarding settlement of the estate and
payment of the taxes, and was told that "all these things take time"
and that he would "take care of all matters in due course., 25 3 The
attorney knew that the dispute did not affect the applicable filing
deadline, but did not so inform Mrs. Saverese.254 Rather, the exec-
utrix interpreted the attorney's assurances to mean that the return
did not have to be filed until the dispute with her sister was re-
245. Id.
246. 71 T.C. 324 (1978).
247. 1979-1 C.B. 1. An acquiescence or nonacquiescence reflects the IRS's position on
adverse Tax Court decisions. These are then published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. The
decision whether to acquiesce applies solely to those issues in the case decided contrary to the
government. The Service may acquiesce "in decision," whereby the conclusion reached is
accepted, but not necessarily the reasoning by which the court reached its conclusion. The
Service may also acquiesce "in result," indicating that the official policy of the Service is
contrary to some or all of the reasons for the decision, although the case may not be appealed.
The effect of an acquiescence is that the Service must follow the decision when the facts and
circumstances are substantially the same. However, an acquiescence may be withdrawn to
correct a mistake of law, with retroactive effect, despite detrimental reliance by a taxpayer.
Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965). Thus, from a planning perspective, blind reliance
upon an acquiescence may prove hazardous. M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE 1 3.04[4] (1981).
248. 71 T.C. at 325.
249. Id. at 326.
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solved.2"5 In early 1973, the attorney was dismissed and a new at-
torney was retained.256 After learning that the return had not been
filed the new attorney promptly had it prepared and filed.25 7
Because there was an undisputed obligation to file a return, the
government predictably argued that the executrix's personal, non-
delegable duty to file the return on time could not be discharged by
reliance on her attorney.25 8 In holding for the taxpayer, the court
noted that through her inquiries, the executrix had made an effort
to ascertain whether the lawyer had taken the necessary steps to file
the return.25 9 Citing Bradley, the court added that since the inexpe-
rienced executrix had been led to believe that the pending dispute
justified the delay in filing, "she was justified in relying on her belief,
albeit that such belief was, in point of fact, erroneous. '2 °
DiPalma is significant because it represents an extension of
Bradley. Bradley held that a taxpayer who relied on inaccurate ad-
vice as to the specific due date of the return had demonstrated rea-
sonable cause for filing late.261 In DiPalma, the advice given to the
taxpayer as to the proper filing date was more ambiguous.262 The
executrix apparently believed that filing was contingent upon the
resolution of the will contest.263 Her belief was based on her gen-
eral impressions of conversations with her lawyer, rather than on
his specific advice.2" She understood the lawyer's remarks to mean
that she could delay the filing indefinitely, while he knew that litiga-
tion did not extend the filing deadline. Therefore, the delay was
attributable to a general failure of communication, rather than to
specifically erroneous advice.
The result in DiPalma was correct, given the executrix's inexpe-
rience and repeated inquiries.2 65 Bradley, however, is the stronger
case for future taxpayers. If the rather imprecise misinformation
given in DiPalma suffices to demonstrate reasonable cause, then a
fortiori the very precise, but inaccurate, advice given in Bradley
should result in the taxpayer avoiding the late filing penalty.266
255. Id. at 325-26.
256. Id. at 326.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 327.
259. Id.
260. Id.; Bradley, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 70 (1974), a ffd, 511 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1975).
261. 71 T.C. 324 (1978).
262. See id. at 327.
263. See id. at 325-26.
264. Id. at 325.
265. See supra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
266. As will be discussed in the next section, see infra notes 414-18 and accompanying
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In Sanderling, Inc. v. Commissioner,67 the Third Circuit
reached the same result as the Tax Court in Bradley. As in Bradley,
the taxpayer filed after the actual deadline, but within the time ad-
vised. 68 The Third Circuit held that the corporate taxpayer, which
had entrusted the filing of its income tax return to an accountant,
necessarily relied on the adviser's professional competence to com-
plete and file the return.2 6 9 Although the court held the taxpayer
not liable for the penalty, the unusual facts in Sanderling raise
doubts about the case's precedential value.27°
The dispute in Sanderling resulted from a corporate liquidation.
The taxpayer's fiscal year ended on February twenty-eighth, which
would ordinarily dictate a May fifteenth deadline.271 In November
1968, however, the corporation adopted a plan of complete liquida-
tion,272 and on January 22, 1969, it distributed all of its assets.273
Because of the liquidation, the return was due on April 15, 1969.274
The taxpayer's certified public accountant did not mail the return
until May 14, 1969, apparently because he had forgotten about the
liquidation.275 The IRS received the return five days later, on May
19, 1969, at which point the confusion began.2 76
Initially, the IRS determined that the taxpayer owed a five per-
cent penalty because an agent incorrectly thought the return was
four days late.277 After litigation began, the Commissioner
text, it is inconsistent for the government to acquiesce in DiPalma and similar cases, see
Marprowear Profit-Sharing Trust v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1086 (1980), acq. 1983-2 C.B. 1;
infra note 416, and yet argue that it should prevail in cases such as Smith v. United States,
702 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1983), and Estate of Kerber v. United States, 717 F.2d 454 (8th Cir.),
petition for cert filed sub nor. Doring v. United States, 52 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Dec. 22,1983)
(No. 83-1038).
267. 66 T.C. 743 (1976) (supplemental opinion appearing at 67 T.C. 176 (1976)), rev'd,
571 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1978).
268. 66 T.C. at 748.
269. 571 F.2d at 175, 178-79.
270. See infra notes 272-80 and accompanying text.
271. 571 F.2d at 176; see also I.R.C. § 6072(b) (1982).
272. The liquidation plan was adopted pursuant to I.R.C. § 337 (1982).
273. 571 F.2d at 175.
274. According to Rev. Rul. 71-129, 1971-1 C.B. 397, a corporation which has com-
pletely liquidated must file a return for the short period ending on the date of liquidation
prior to dissolution. The return must be filed "on or before the fifteenth day of the third full
month following the close of the short period." Id. Since the taxpayer in Sanderling liqui-
dated in January, the deadline for the corporation's income tax return was April 15, 1969.
275. 66 T.C. 743, 758-59.
276. 571 F.2d at 177.
277. Id. at 176. The examining agent first insisted that the corporation had not been
liquidated until April, 1971. Id. Had this been the case, the 1969 return should have been for
a full taxable year, ending on February 28, 1969, with the May 15 filing date applying. Id.
Assuming that May 15 was the correct date, the agent determined that the return was filed
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amended his answer, to assert correctly that the due date was April
15, 1969, and to request a ten percent penalty.278 Under Tax Court
rules,27 9 the assertion of the larger penalty was "new matter" that
shifted the burden of proof on that issue to the Commissioner.28°
Although the Tax Court imposed the ten percent penalty,281 the
Third Circuit reversed.282 Observing that the governing statute
uses the words "reasonable cause," rather than "extraordinary cir-
cumstances," the court of appeals held that the government had not
met its burden of showing that the taxpayer had acted unreasonably
in relying on its accountant.283 The court recognized that when the
corporation entrusted the return to its accountant, "it necessarily
relied on his professional competence to determine not only what
should be in the return but when it should be filed."' 284 The court
cited the IRS's confusion over the proper deadline as evidence that
the due date could not be determined readily, and held that the
taxpayer acted reasonably in relying on the accountant's profes-
sional expertise.28
four days late because it was not received until May 19, giving rise to a one-month, five-
percent penalty. Id. The difficulty with this position is that § 7502(a) provided that when the
date of mailing occurs before the due date, the return is timely filed. If the Service were
correct as to the date of liquidation, no penalty could be imposed. Ultimately the IRS con-
ceded that the liquidation had occurred in January, 1969. Sanderling, 571 F.2d at 176-78;
I.R.C. § 7502(a) (1982).
278. 66 T.C. at 757.
279. 0.S. TAx Cr. R.P. 142(a).
280. 66 T.C. at 757-58; 571 F.2d at 178.
281. 66 T.C. at 759-60. The IRS has determined that the timely mailing provision of
§ 7502(a) does not apply when the mailing occurs after the due date. See Rev. Rul. 73-133,
1973-1 C.B. 606 (date of filing becomes date of receipt). The Tax Court has agreed that Rev.
Rul. 73-133 is the proper reading of § 7502(a). Sanderling, 67 T.C. 176, 179 (supplemental
opinion). Since the return was due April 15, but deemed not filed until received May 19, the
Service imposed a two-month 10% penalty. 66 T.C. at 757. Because the Third Circuit deter-
mined that reasonable cause existed for the late filing, it did not reach this issue. 571 F.2d
174, 178 n.5.
282. Sanderling, 571 F.2d 174.
283. Id. at 178.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 177-79 ("A privilege the [IRS] allows itself but would deny the taxpayer.").
The court stated:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the government proved the tax-
payer was not reasonable in relying on its professional adviser to determine when
the return was due. The inquiry is not concluded merely by showing that the ac-
countant apparently chose the wrong date. Rather, the issue is whether the correct
due date was so uncertain that the taxpayer was reasonable in relying on profes-
sional advice. This case does not involve the delegation of a purely ministerial task
and is thus distinguishable from those decisions which allow the imposition of a
penalty where the accountant was late in filing the return but the taxpayer was
aware of the due date.
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Although Sanderling and Bradley reached the same results, re-
lieving misadvised taxpayers of the late filing penalty, two factors
make Sanderling a less definitive opinion than Bradley. First, the
Third Circuit repeatedly stressed the uncertainty and confusion dis-
played by both the government and the taxpayer.286 Thus, the
question arises whether the result would have changed if the IRS
had been less confused or the due date more readily determina-
ble.287 Second, Sanderling was unusual because the Commissioner
had the burden of proof on the reasonable cause issue.288 It is possi-
ble that the case would have been decided differently had that bur-
den been on the taxpayer.
Sanderling did, however, draw some careful distinctions be-
tween the "whether" and the "when" authority.2 89 The court did
not follow the overbroad language of United States v. Kroll,290 that
when there is no question that a return is due, the taxpayer has a
personal, nondelegable duty to file the return on time.291 Rather,
Sanderling limited Kroll to its actual holding that taxpayers pos-
sessing actual knowledge of due dates cannot avoid the section
6651(a)(1) penalty on the sole ground of reliance on an expert.292
The obvious inference is that the Third Circuit rejected a per se
reading of Kroll. That is, the court viewed the critical issue as not
being merely whether the taxpayer knew a return was required, but
whether, in addition, he knew the due date.293 The court's subse-
quent use of the cases involving legal advice about whether to file,
coupled with its recognition that reliance on an expert necessarily
includes reliance as to deadlines, are strong indicia that Sanderling
would apply to misadvised executors as well as to misadvised
286. See id. at 175, 177-79.
287. This question is important because the court framed the issue as being "whether the
correct due date was so uncertain that the taxpayer was reasonable in relying on professional
advice." 571 F.2d at 178. If the reasonableness of the taxpayer's reliance depends on the
difficulty of the underlying question of law, then Sanderling offers little support to the late
filing executor, because the correct deadline for an estate tax return is neither uncertain nor
difficult for an expert to determine. Section 6075(a) unequivocally states that an estate tax
return is due nine months after the decedent's death. I.R.C. § 6075(a) (1982). Attorneys and
accountants who err as to the nine-month figure apparently do so either because they believe
the former 15-month limit is still in effect, or because they do not consider the possibility that
the state tax deadline may be longer than the federal, not because the correct answer is intrin-
sically difficult. See supra notes 64-65.
288. See Sanderling, 571 F.2d at 178.
289. See id. at 178-79.
290. 547 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1977).
291. Id. at 396.
292. See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
293. See Sanderling, 571 F.2d at 177.
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corporations.294
Bradley, DiPalma, and Sanderling are correct in holding that a
taxpayer who knows a return is required but is misadvised as to its
deadline is not subject to the late filing penalty if he files within the
time he has been advised is available. A taxpayer who is permitted
to rely without penalty on erroneous advice as to whether a return
294. The Third Circuit has not decided a § 6651(a)(1) case since Sanderling. However, a
Third Circuit district court applied Sanderling to a late-filed estate tax return in Lewis v.
United States, 467 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Pa. 1979). The district court carefully noted that the
Third Circuit had focused on the taxpayer's knowledge of the due date. The court correctly
read Sanderling as establishing two principles: (1) the failure to exercise reasonable cause is
not established as a matter of law merely because the taxpayer knows that a tax return is
required; and (2) the failure to exercise reasonable cause is established as a matter of law
where the taxpayer knows that a tax return is required and also knows the due date, yet
continues to rely on counsel to fie the return. Id. at 32. Applying that case, the court held
mostly, but not entirely, for the government. See id.
The facts of Lewis bear a marked resemblance to those of United States v. Kroll, 547 F.2d
393 (7th Cir. 1977). The taxpayer in Lewis was the administrator of his mother's estate. 467
F. Supp. at 30. The estate tax return was due nine months after the decedent's death, or on
January 15, 1975, but the estate's attorney incorrectly told the administrator that he had 15
months in which to file. Id. Shortly after the actual due date, the taxpayer was informed by a
bank trust officer that the return was delinquent. Id. at 31. Despite this information, the
return was not filed until some 18 months later. Id. As in Kroll, the Lewis court held that
once the administrator was aware the return was past due, his failure to fie was unreasonable
as a matter of law notwithstanding his reliance on counsel to file. Id. at 31-32. Because the
maximum late filing penalty can be imposed after five months, and because the taxpayer was
18 months late in filing the return, the court did not have to determine, for purposes of that
penalty, whether the taxpayer's reliance on his attorney between January 15 and January 27,
1975 was reasonable. Id. at 32. It therefore granted summary judgment against the taxpayer
for the full amount of the late filing penalty. Id.
The court also assessed a late payment penalty under I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2) (1982). Because
that penalty accrues at one-half of one percent per month, up to a maximum of 25%, it takes
50 months for the late payment penalty to accrue in full. See supra note 8 and accompanying
text. Since only 18 months had elapsed, the late payment penalty necessarily involved the
question whether the administrator's reliance on his attorney was reasonable for the period
between January 15 (the actual date of the return, about which the taxpayer had been mis-
advised) and January 27 (the date the taxpayer was informed the return was delinquent). The
disputed penalty for this 12-day period was $192.55. 467 F. Supp. at 31. The court denied
the government's motion for summary judgment with respect to that sum, holding that genu-
ine issues of fact were presented as to the reasonableness of the administrator's reliance on
counsel between the January 15 and 27. Id. at 32.
The only unfortunate aspect of Lewis is that the court did not specify what those issues of
fact were. A taxpayer's ability to demonstrate that he was misadvised as to the due date, by
itself, should not be viewed as sufficient reasonable cause for late filing. By analogy to the
first line of authority, he should also have to show that he made full disclosure to his attorney
and that he reasonably believed the attorney to be competent in tax law. See supra notes
15-16. It is unclear what the district court thought the factual issues were. If the issues
involved the complexity of the due date and the taxpayer's burden of proof then Lewis is a
fairly narrow reading of that case. If the factual issues pertained to disclosure and compe-
tency, Lewis is a correspondingly broader reading of Sanderling. It is regrettable that an
otherwise perceptive opinion was so imprecise on this point.
19841
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
is required should be permitted to rely on erroneous advice as to
when to file, since the policies underlying reliance on both types of
advice are the same. The fundamental issue in all section 665 l(a)(1)
cases is whether the taxpayer acted with ordinary business care and
prudence.295 Cases pertaining to legal advice as to whether a return
is required are based on the assumption that the typical taxpayer 296
is neither trained nor expected to perform legal research. This does
not mean that the taxpayer has no responsibilities. He is held to the
duties of finding an apparently competent tax adviser and making
full disclosure to him because he is capable of performing those
tasks.2 97 In contrast, he is permitted to rely on substantively erro-
neous legal advice because he has neither the capacity to perform
the research himself nor the ability to detect the adviser's error.
Because the issue of a return's due date is a legal question, the
rationale of the cases involving legal advice whether to fie is appli-
cable equally to cases involving when to file.298 The Bradley court
expressly recognized this when it permitted the taxpayer to rely on
legal advice as to the return's deadline. As the court correctly rea-
soned, a contrary holding would require the taxpayer to research
the deadline question himself.2 99 A similar concern about requiring
the taxpayer to do his own legal research underlies the decisions of
295. See, eg., supra notes 9-10, 144-47 and accompanying text.
296. The typical taxpayer is neither an accountant nor an attorney.
297. See Estate of Geraci v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 424 (1973), afl'd, 502 F.2d
1148 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975). In Geraci, the attorney miscalculated
the deadline, but the executrix was properly penalized where she made no effort either to
obtain an extension or to have the work assigned to a different attorney when the estate's
attorney became incapacitated for two months. 32 T.C.M. at 425-26.
A taxpayer's need to prove not only that he received erroneous legal advice but that he
justifiably relied on the adviser is illustrated by the holding in Goff v. Commissioner, 37
T.C.M. (CCH) 199 (1978). Although the executrix in Goffwas active and cooperative, she
never inquired about the estate tax return's deadline. Id. at 202. She correctly was held liable
for the penalty because she failed to consult the person on whom she should have relied, the
estate's attorney, and because there was no showing that the attorney was mistaken about the
deadline. Id. She was not entitled to rely on the advice of the person (her son-in-law) who
gave her erroneous information about the deadline, because he was shown not to be compe-
tent in tax matters. Id.
298. It seems clear that the question when to file is a legal question, the answer to which
depends upon a statutory provision. In Bonvicini v. United States, 52 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)
11148,595 (D. Colo. 1983), a district court suggested that the issue of whether a return had to
be filed was a legal question, but the filing date was a ministerial question. Although
Bonvicini cited United States v. Kroll, 547 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1977), in support of this conten-
tion, Kroll drew no such distinction. Rather, Kroll stated that a taxpayer was entitled to
entrust "any question of tax law, complicated or otherwise," to an attorney. 547 F.2d at 395
(emphasis added).
299. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 73.
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Rohrabaugh v. United States3" and Gray v. United States"' and
indeed may be the principal basis for each decision."0 2
Other decisions, however, are in marked contrast to those of the
Tax Court and the Third Circuit. The Seventh Circuit, in Fleming
v. United States,3 ' and the Eighth Circuit, in Smith v. United
States3" and Estate of Kerber v. United States,3"' both held that
taxpayers cannot rely on legal advice about deadlines. In these
cases the taxpayers were advised to file after the actual due date.
Each taxpayer filed within the time he thought was available, but
nonetheless was penalized. The effect of these decisions is that a
taxpayer who relies on advice about deadlines proceeds at his own
risk. He can avoid the penalty only if the advice given is correct,
even though he is not capable of checking the accuracy of that ad-
vice. 06 These decisions are neither reconcilable with Bradley,
300. In Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1977), the court stated:
We do have some difficulty in not allowing the inexperienced person to rely when he
has no knowledge of when a return might be due and has told the attorney to pre-
pare and file the return and the attorney has undertaken this task, hardly non-
technical in the case of a federal estate tax return, while saying he can rely when he
is given some technical advice on some matter of tax law.
Id. at 217.
301. 453 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Mo. 1978). The Gray court stated that it was the attor-
ney's task, not the taxpayer's, "to delve into the tax code and its regulations" to ascertain a
return's deadline. 453 F. Supp. at 1361. The court added that it refused "to hold that plain-
tiff was required to research the Internal Revenue Code to ascertain the due date of the
estate's return when she had no knowledge that anything was amiss." Id.
302. In both Rohrabaugh and Gray, the taxpayers failed to inquire about the deadline.
Had they inquired, they would have been given erroneous information. It is difficult to be-
lieve that the cases would have been decided as they were had one of those two elements been
missing. If the taxpayers had failed to inquire, but would have received accurate information
on request, the courts probably would have been less willing to decide that no inquiry was
needed. On the other hand, had inquiry been made and erroneous information been given,
the court might have adopted the Bradley rationale, due to its uneasiness with the prospect of
requiring a taxpayer to do his own legal research. It was singularly unfortunate that the dual
elements of no inquiry and wrong information came together as they did, because the courts
did not differentiate the issues. The ultimate resolution in both Rohrabaugh and Gray was
incorrect. The courts rewarded ignorance and permitted taxpayers to choose their own time
for negligently filing returns. Had inquiry been made and the wrong answer given, the deci-
sions for the taxpayers would have been correct. That the courts were wrong as to the duty
to inquire does not mean they were wrong in their concern about the plight of a taxpayer who
may be penalized because he is the recipient of erroneous advice.
303. 648 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1981).
304. 702 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1983).
305. 717 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1983), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Doring v. United
States, 52 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1983) (No. 83-1038).
306. Judge Cudahy, dissenting in Fleming v. United States, 648 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.
1981), pointed out that the majority did not suggest what a taxpayer ought to do when erro-
neously told that the legal effect of filing an application for extension was to extend the time
for filing by one year. Id. at 1128. The judge asked whether the taxpayer should challenge
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DiPalma, and Sanderling, nor do they offer sound analysis for their
results.3 °7
C. Cases in Which the Taxpayer is Penalized
In Smith v. United States308 and Estate of Kerber v. United
States30 9 the Eighth Circuit held taxpayers liable for the section
6651(a)(1) penalty even though their late filing was the result of
erroneous legal advice about the appropriate due dates. In both
cases the attorney had informed the executor that he had one year,
rather than nine months, in which to file the estate tax return. 310
The taxpayers relied on this erroneous advice and filed within the
time they believed was available. 31I Relying on its previous deci-
sions in Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner312 and Boeving v. United
States,31 3 the Eighth Circuit reiterated its Boeving holding that
"[t]he executor or executrix has a personal and nondelegable duty
to fie a timely return, and reliance on the mistaken advice of coun-
sel is not sufficient to constitute 'reasonable cause' for failing to ful-
fill that duty.",314 Unfortunately, the court's analysis in Smith and
Kerber does not extend beyond this quotation from Boeving. An
examination of Boeving and its predecessor, Lillehei, reveals a criti-
cal error in the Boeving court's use of Lillehei.
In Lillehei, the taxpayer knew a return was required but did not
inquire about its deadline. 315 The taxpayer's duty of inquiry in this
situation was the subject of conffict between two district courts in
the Eighth Circuit. In Gray v. United States,316 the court held that
the attorney and read the IRC provisions himself. Id. He then concluded, "[w]ithout even a
beginning tax course in law school, the futility of this approach is apparent." Id.
307. See infra notes 311-49 and accompanying text.
308. 702 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
309. 717 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
310. Smith, 702 F.2d at 742; Kerber, 717 F.2d at 454-55.
311. In Smith, the return was due on September 17, 1979, but was filed on December 7,
1979, 10 days before the first anniversary of the decedent's death. 702 F.2d at 742. In Ker-
ber, the return was filed on October 10, 1978, a year after the decedent died. 717 F.2d at
454-55.
312. 638 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
313. 650 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1981).
314. Smith, 702 F.2d at 743; Kerber, 717 F.2d at 455.
315. 39 T.C.M. (CCII) 518, 519 (1979), aff'd, 638 F.2d 65, 66 (8th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam).
316. 453 F. Supp. 1356, 1361 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
Gray 'also conflicted with Richter v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1977),
which held that an administrator had an obligation "to ascertain the date by which the return
had to be filed and to insure its filing by that date." Id. at 924.
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no inquiry need be made, but the court in Daley v. United States317
expressly disapproved of Gray.
Because Lillehei presented precisely the same issue as Gray and
Daley, it was an ideal vehicle to resolve the conflict between them.
The executor in Lillehei, a physician who previously was the execu-
tor of another estate, knew he was required to file an estate tax re-
turn.318 However, he neither knew when it was due nor made any
inquiry to find out.3 19 Instead, he passively relied on his attorney to
file on time.320 The Tax Court held for the government, flatly re-
jecting Gray.32  In accordance with its prior opinions, 322 the Tax
Court held that an executor has a positive duty to ascertain and
comply with the filing deadline, and that failure to inquire is a fail-
ure to exercise ordinary business care and prudence.323 On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit affirmed on the basis of the Tax Court's opinion
without mentioning either Gray or Daley.3 24 Although the Eighth
Circuit's failure to resolve the Gray-Daley conflict expressly is re-
grettable, Lillehei must be read as overruling Gray.325
317. 480 F. Supp. 808, 812 (D.N.D. 1979).
318. Lillehei, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) at 519; 638 F.2d at 66.
319. Id.
320. 39 T.C.M. (CCH) at 520; see 638 F.2d at 66.
321. 39 T.C.M. (CCH) at 520 (quoting Estate of Rapelje v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82,
89 n.7 (1979)).
322. See cases cited supra note 170.
323. 39 T.C.M. (CCH) at 520-21.
324. 638 F.2d at 66. In its brief per curiam opinion, the court merely stated it was af-
firming on the basis of the Tax Court's decision.
325. In Corum v. United States, 49 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 148,512 (W.D. Mo. 1982), the
taxpayer argued that he should be relieved of the § 6651(a)(1) penalty because of Gray v.
United States, 453 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Mo. 1978) and Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611
F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1979). 49 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1 148,512, at 82-1505. The court concluded
that the Eighth Circuit knew of Gray through its review of Lillehel and Boeving and that this
could only mean that it had "rejected the rule of Gray that allows the taxpayer to rely on the
expertise of a lawyer." Id. Corum properly held liable an executor who had known that
taxes had to be paid before the estate was closed, but who had not inquired about when
payment was due. Id. The taxpayer claimed he did not know a return had to be filed, but the
court correctly imposed the penalty since under Lillehei he was obligated to ascertain his
obligations as executor.
The combined effect of Boeving, Smith, and Kerber is probably to overrule two early dis-
trict court cases in which penalties were avoided because of erroneous legal advice about
deadlines. The first of these, Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. United States, 30 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)
147,676 (D.S.D. 1972), bears considerable resemblance to Estate of DiPalma v. Commis-
sioner, 71 T.C. 324 (1978). See supra notes 158-66. In Northwestern Nat'! Bank, a bank was
appointed as executor of the estate of a testate decedent. 30 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1147,676, at
72-5828. The will was contested and declared invalid by a state trial court, but was later
upheld by the South Dakota Supreme Court. In re Estate of Farnsworth, 84 S.D. 675, 176
N.W.2d 247 (1970). The executor filed the return at this point, but it was more than two
years late. Northwestern Nat'! Bank, 30 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1147,676, at 72-5828. Opposing
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In its next opinion, Boeving v. United States, 326 the Eighth Cir-
cuit made its critical analytical error. The decedent in Boeving died
on September 13, 1973, making the return due on June 13, 1974.327
The administratrix, the decedent's daughter-in-law, was an unem-
ployed rural housewife with no business, financial, or tax experi-
32832ence, who was appointed because of exigent circumstances.329
Preparation of the return was complicated further by the death of
the family accountant.3 30 Although it is unclear whether the ad-
imposition of the penalty, the executor offered testimony that the cost of the appeal and
administration expenses had been unknown, that it had been threatened with suit by the
contesting party, and that it had been advised by its attorney to delay filing until the will
contest was concluded. Id. The estate's attorney testified that he had counseled delay be-
cause a return filed before the litigation was concluded could not be accurate. Id. The court
merely stated that reliance on the advice of an attorney is the exercise of ordinary business
care and prudence. Id..at 72-5829.
In Tennyson v. United States, 37 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 148,060 (W.D. Ark. 1976), the
taxpayer should have filed a gift tax return in 1964. Id. at 76-1552 to -1553. He had assigned
two-thirds of his limited partnership interest in a natural gas field investment to his children
and their spouses in 1962, retaining the interest until his initial $50,000 investment was
recouped. Id. at 76-1548 to -1549. His attorney advised him that he need not file a gift tax
return for 1962 because the gift did not have a value at that time. Id. at 76-1553. Actually
1962 was not the correct year for filing because the gift was incomplete. Id. at 76-1551. In
1964, the gas field was sold on an installment basis and the taxpayer gave the notes he held to
his children. Id. at 76-1552. Although that transfer completed the gift, the taxpayer thought
the gift had been made in 1962. Id. at 76-1553. On the advice of his accountant he did not
file a 1964 gift tax return. Id. The court held the taxpayer was entitled to rely on the advice
given, even though it was erroneous. Id.
Since both Northwestern Nat' Bank and Tennyson involved the question when (rather
than whether) a tax return had to be filed, it seems unlikely they have survived the Eighth
Circuit decisions that a taxpayer may not rely on an attorney's advice about due dates.
326. 493 F. Supp. 665 (E.D. Mo. 1980), rev'd, 650 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1981).
327. 493 F. Supp. at 666-67. See also supra note 77.
328. 493 F. Supp. at 670.
329. Id. at 667.
330. Id. at 670. The Boeving facts are complicated. Ethyle Boeving, the decedent, had
been adjudicated an incompetent in 1960. Id. at 666. Her husband Albert Boeving had died
in 1961, leaving the bulk of his property in two trusts, one for Ethyle and the other for the
couple's adopted son, William Boeving. Id. Ethyle possessed a general power of appoint-
ment over her trust assets, with William's trust the taker in default of appointment. Id.
Ethyle died intestate in September, 1973, without exercising her power of appointment. Id.
At issue in the case was whether the assets of the Ethyle Boeving trust were to be included in
her gross estate under I.R.C. § 2041 (1982). Id. at 666-67. The district court held that
because Ethyle had been adjudicated an incompetent prior to her husband's death, she was
precluded from having a general power of appointment under Missouri law and hence the
assets subject to that power were not includable in her gross estate. Id. at 669. The Eighth
Circuit reversed on this issue, agreeing with the Commissioner's position that he should look
only to the trust instrument itself to determine whether a power of appointment existed, not
to the competency of the grantee under state law. 650 F.2d 493, 494-95 (1981).
Willisn was appointed his mother's guardian when she was adjudicated incompetent.
493 F. Supp. at 670. William had a history of alcoholism and mental disorder, and his per-
formance as guardian was totally unsatisfactory. Id. Accordingly, his wife, Joan Boeving,
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ministratrix inquired about the due date, the estate's attorney erro-
neously believed that the deadline was one year after the date of
death. 3 ' On June 13, 1974, the attorney requested an extension,
and on April 7, 1975, he ified the return.332
The district court held that the taxpayer had established reason-
able cause for the late filing.333 The court observed that although
the administratrix chose an attorney who was mistaken as to the
law, this act, without more, "is not so unreasonable on her part as
to justify the imposition of the section 6651 penalty on her for the
mistakes of her attorney, ' 334 and concluded it was "patently un-
fair" to penalize her for her attorney's legal determinations.335
The court of appeals reversed. 336  The portion of the opinion
discussing the penalty issue consists of two brief and cryptic
paragraphs.337 The Eighth Circuit stated that the district court
"based its conclusion primarily on the ground that Boeving reason-
ably had relied on the expertise of an attorney who honestly was
mistaken as to the required filing date. ' 338 It then concluded that
Lillehei precluded such treatment.339 The court's entire analysis is
found in its statement that "[t]he executor or executrix has a per-
sonal and nondelegable duty to file a timely return, and reliance on
the mistaken advice of counsel is not sufficient to constitute 'reason-
able cause' for failing to fulfill that duty.'34°
Given Boeving's particular facts, 34' the result probably was cor-
assumed his duties as guardian and later was appointed as administratrix of Ethyle's estate.
Id. Joan had no particular qualifications for this position, but did know that an estate tax
return had to be filed. Id. The filing was complicated by the death of Joseph L. Smith, the
Boeving family's accountant, two months after the decedent's death. Id. at 670. He had
served as coexecutor of Albert's estate and as cotrustee of the trusts for both Ethyle and
William, and had maintained all the pertinent financial records. Id. After Mr. Smith's death,
an attorney, Charles Cable, became cotrustee of the trust and was hired by Joan to represent
the decedent's estate. Id. Cable believed that the estate tax return was due 12 rather than 9
months after Ethyle's death. Id. The change in law reducing the period for filing from 15 to
9 months had come two years earlier. See supra note 77.
331. 493 F. Supp. at 670.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 671.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 673.
336. Boeving, 650 F.2d 493.
337. Id. at 495. The court of appeals also reversed the district court on the issue of
whether certain assets should be included in the decedent's gross estate under § 2041. See
supra note 325; I.R.C. § 2041 (1982).
338. 650 F.2d at 495.
339. Id.; Lillehei, 638 F.2d at 65.
340. 650 F.2d at 495.
341. See supra note 330.
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rect. The administratrix was passive and may not have attempted
to ascertain the due date. More importantly, she filed the return
not only after its actual deadline, but also after the time the attorney
thought it was due.342 Liability should have been imposed for these
reasons, however, rather than for the reason enunciated by the
Eighth Circuit.
Lillehei343 is authority for the proposition that a taxpayer has an
obligation to inquire about the filing date of a return known to be
required. 3 " It neither purports to address the situation where the
taxpayer is given wrong information in response to an inquiry,345
nor properly applies there. The court's use of Lillehei in Boeving
reflects a disturbing lack of analysis. 346  The Eighth Circuit com-
pletely failed to consider whether different facts might warrant dif-
ferent results. This lack of analysis is even more distressing in
Smith" 7 and Kerber,348 in which the taxpayers were diligent and
had filed within the time they were advised was available.349
342. The attorney, who believed the return was due on September 13, 1974, filed a letter
requesting an extension on September 12, 1974. 493 F. Supp. at 670. Although neither Boev-
ing opinion states what happened to this request, presumably it was denied because it was
made after the actual due date. See supra note 79. Since the return was not filed until April
7, 1975, the maximum penalty would have accrued whether the starting time was measured
from June 13, 1974 (the actual due date) or the date the request for an extension was sent.
Even had an extension been granted, the maximum length would have been six months. See
I.R.C. § 6081(a) (1982). Six months from the actual due date would have been December 13,
1974, while six months from the extension request would have been March 12, 1975. In the
former case a 20% penalty would have accrued by the filing date; in the latter case, a 5%
penalty would have accrued.
In Shaw v. United States, 49 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) % 148,508 (S.D. Iowa 1982), the actual
deadline was June 24, 1974. Id. at 82-1482. The executrix was told she had until September
24, 1974 to file the return. Id. The return was filed on November 19, 1974. Id. Relying on
Boeving, the court imposed a 25% penalty. Id. A better analysis would have been to hold the
executrix liable for a 10% penalty for the period between the deadline she believed was avail-
able (September 24, 1974) and the time the return was filed (November 19, 1974).
343. 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 518 (1970), af'd per curiam, 638 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1981).
344. See 39 T.C.M. (CCH) at 520; 638 F.2d at 66.
345. See id.
346. See supra notes 339--40 and accompanying text.
347. 701 F.2d at 741.
348. 717 F.2d at 454.
349. See supra note 311. The Kerber executrix was particularly active and diligent. See
717 F.2d at 455. On the advice of the estate's attorney, she hired a certified public accountant
to prepare the return. Id. She made a number of inquiries about the accountant's progress
and determined, after ten weeks, that he had completely neglected his work. Id. She then
discharged him and retained a new accountant. Id.
Because of his mistake in believing the estate had a year in which to file, the attorney for
the estate did not supply the second accountant with any information about the estate until
after the due date passed. Id. The new accountant promptly sought an extension of time,
immediately made a payment of estimated taxes, and filed the return on the day the attorney
initially determined it was due. Id. Short of somehow acquiring the knowledge of the actual
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Fleming v. United States350 is a more complex case than Smith
and Kerber. In Fleming, the estate's attorney correctly informed
the taxpayer that the deadline for filing the return was October 18,
1972.351 Because of the complicated nature of the estate,35 2 the at-
torney advised the taxpayer that it would be necessary to obtain an
extension of time for filing from the IRS.353 He subsequently told
the taxpayer that he filed the application and that the effect of the
application was to extend automatically the time for filing one
year.35 4 The attorney, however, never sent the application.3 5 The
taxpayer fied the return on August 22, 1973, more than ten months
after the actual due date, but within the time he had been advised
was available. 6
The Seventh Circuit stated that United States v. Kroll
35 7
squarely controlled the case and held for the government.358
Although the opinion is opaque, the court advanced three reasons
for its result. The first two, which are intertwined, are that the tax-
payer knew the actual due date and that he did not properly obtain
an extension. 359 Third, the court imputed the attorney's negligence
in not obtaining an extension to the taxpayer. 360 As the dissent lu-
deadline herself, it is hard to see what else the executrix in Kerber could have done to ensure
timely filing.
In Estate of Mayer v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 403 (1964), afd, 351 F.2d 617 (2d Cir.
1965), cert denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966), the executor, a certified public accountant knowl-
edgeable about income and estate taxes, hired an attorney who miscalculated the due date.
43 T.C. at 405. The executor signed a document that contained information about the filing
deadline on its face. Because he was familiar with tax law and because the due date was
clearly drawn to his attention, the executor was properly held liable for the § 6651(a)(1)
penalty. See id. at 407.
350. 648 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1981), affig 483 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
351. 648 F.2d at 1123.
352. The settling of the estate was complicated, in part, because the decedent's wife,
Carolyn Fleming, had predeceased her husband and her estate had not been closed. Id. The
decedent's estate was an heir of Carolyn Fleming's estate but the value of the interest could
not be ascertained until her estate was closed. Id. "There were also problems in ascertaining
the extent and value of the decedent's interests in various real estate ventures and in certain
stock of a corporation conducting business in the Bahama Islands." Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1123-24.
355. Id. at 1124. The attorney drafted an application for extension in longhand and
turned it over to his secretary for typing and mailing. The application was never signed, nor
was it mailed to the IRS. Id.
356. Id.
357. 547 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1977).
358. 648 F.2d at 1126.
359. Id. at 1125.
360. Id.
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cidly illustrated, none of these reasons withstands analysis.3 6'
Kroll held that a taxpayer who knows the due date of a required
return has a personal, nondelegable duty to file the return when
due.3 62 The taxpayer in Fleming unquestionably knew the initial
due date of the return was October 18, 1972.363 If no other facts
existed, the Seventh Circuit's statement that Kroll controlled would
have been correct. However, the court's repeated assertions 3 4 that
the taxpayer knew the due date distorts the facts. Although the
taxpayer knew the initial due date, he understood it had been ex-
tended by one year.365 He believed he was filing two months before
the deadline. When the court treats the taxpayer's initial under-
standing of the due date as if it were his later belief, it is being both
inaccurate and dishonest.
The taxpayer argued that it was reasonable for him to rely on
his attorney's assurance that a one-year extension had been ob-
tained.366 The court's response reflects a serious misunderstanding
of the issues involved:
There are many reasons why [the] taxpayer's reliance on his
attorney's statements was not reasonable. In the first place the
attorney did not file an extension application. In the second
place, even if he had filed it, an extension would not have been
automatic. Thirdly, no extension was granted by the IRS. In the
fourth place, even if the IRS had granted an extension, it could
only have been granted for a maximum of 6 months.3 67
Although the four reasons provided by the court are a detailed ex-
planation of why the return was filed late, none of them justify hold-
ing the taxpayer liable for the penalty. The reasons given can be put
into two categories: legal advice (the second and fourth reasons)
and the taxpayer's obligation to obtain an extension (the first and
third reasons). As to legal advice, the court advanced no reasons
why the lay taxpayer should be expected to know either the effect of
an extension application or that the maximum period for an exten-
sion is six months.368
361. See id. at 1127-29 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
362. 547 F.2d at 396.
363. 648 F.2d at 1125.
364. Id. at 1125-27.
365. Id. at 1123-24.
366. Id. at 1125.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 1128 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion forcefully made this
point:
[T]his is a "legal opinion" case where the attorney told the taxpayer that the legal
effect of filing the application for an extension was to automatically extend the time
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In contrast, the court's first and third reasons for not permitting
the taxpayer to rely on his attorney's statements have some
merit.369 The Fleming court held that the taxpayer's personal, non-
delegable duty to fie on time logically encompassed the duty to ob-
tain an extension if needed.37 As a theoretical matter this is
correct. When a taxpayer has a duty to make a timely filing, he can
discharge that duty properly in one of two ways. He can either file
by the original due date3"' or he can take steps to have the due date
extended.37 2 The same standard should govern either course of ac-
tion. Since a taxpayer cannot avoid the penalty for the late filing of
a return known to be required if his only excuse is that he delegated
the responsibility for filing,373 he also should not be able to avoid
liability solely on the ground that he had delegated the responsibil-
ity of obtaining an extension. It would be anomalous to hold the
taxpayer liable if he failed to file on or before the original due date,
yet not hold him liable if he relied solely on another in seeking an
extension of that due date.374
Moreover, requiring the taxpayer to ensure that an extension is
obtained is correct as a practical matter. Although the lay taxpayer
is not equipped to check the accuracy of legal advice, he certainly
can ascertain, through inquiry and supervision, whether an exten-
sion application has been made. In sum, the taxpayer should be
required to obtain an extension for the same reasons that he is held
to a duty to inquire about deadlines.375
The difficulty in Fleming is not the court's holding that the tax-
payer has a duty to obtain an extension, but its determination that
the duty had not been discharged in that case.3 76 The taxpayer in
for filing the return and payment of the tax for one year. The majority does not
suggest what the taxpayer should do in the face of such an opinion-challenge the
attorney and read the Internal Revenue Code provisions and regulations himself?
Without even a beginning tax course in law school, the futility of this approach is
apparent. Or I suppose one might consult a second attorney, although I do not
understand our function to be providing work for the tax bar.
Id.
369. See supra note 367 and accompanying text.
370. Fleming, 648 F.2d at 1126. "The taxpayer had a personal non-delegable duty to file
the return on time and this duty extended to and encompassed the proper and timely filing of
an application for an extension and the ascertainment that an extension had been granted."
Id. at 1126-27.
371. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
372. See I.R.C. § 6081(a) (1982).
373. See Kroll v. United States, 547 F.2d 393, 396 (7th Cir. 1977).
374. See Twin City Constr. Co. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 767, 770 (D.N.D. 1981).
375. See supra notes 157-214 and accompanying text.
376. 648 F.2d at 1126-27.
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Fleming did not delegate the job of acquiring an extension to his
attorney and then ignore the matter; rather, he delegated the task
and after further inquiry was told that the extension had been ob-
tained.377  In addition, unlike the situation in Kroll,378 where the
executor had to sign the return and the check for taxes due,379 the
taxpayer in Fleming did not have to sign the application for an ex-
tension.380 Such applications can be signed by the attorney or other
agent of the taxpayer.38 1 As the dissent observed, Kroll and Flem-
ing involved different circumstances.382 The Kroll taxpayer had no-
tice that by not signing, he was preventing the filing of a crucial
document.383 The Fleming taxpayer had no such notice.384
In effect, the Seventh Circuit held in Fleming that the taxpayer
could not accept his attorney's oral assurance that an extension had
been obtained. 385  Apparently, taxpayers must demand documen-
tary proof of their lawyers' statements,386 even though there may be
no reason for them to doubt what they are told.38 7 If the taxpayer
377. Id. at 1123-24.
378. 547 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1977).
379. Id. at 396.
380. See 648 F.2d at 1123.
381. Fleming, 648 F.2d at 1128 (dissenting opinion). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-
3(a)(1) (1972).
382. 648 F.2d at 1128 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
383. 547 F.2d at 396.
384. See 648 F.2d at 1128.
385. See id. at 1126-27.
386. In Crouse v. United States, 50 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1 148,552 (S.D. Iowa 1982), affid
per curiam, 711 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1983), the district court reluctantly concluded that admin-
istrators of estates must do more than sign returns and execute checks for estate taxes. 50
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1148,552, at 82-6220. The court intimated that a taxpayer must also
watch his attorney put the return and check in an envelope and mail it. Id. The Crouse facts
are unusual, involving not only an attorney who lied about sending in the return and checks,
but also administrators who let 19 months pass while two estate tax checks totaling more
than $236,000 remained uncashed. Id. On these facts, the taxpayers were properly held
liable for the penalty (which already had been paid by the law firm). See, eg., supra notes
66-73, 101-03 and accompanying text.
387. Fleming was decided on the government's motion for summary judgment. 648 F.2d
at 1123. The record in the case was sparse, consisting of affidavits submitted by the personal
representative and his attorney. 483 F. Supp. at 285. There may have been some reason for
the taxpayer to follow up on his attorney's statements; it is conceivable that previous conduct
by the attorney put the personal representative on notice that he needed proof of statements
made. But the record gave no hint of this possibility. Had it done so, summary judgment
should have been denied and additional evidence required.
It is informative to compare Fleming with other cases in which extensions were discussed
but not obtained. In Consolidated-Hammer Dry Plate & Film Co. v. Commissioner, 317
F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1963), the corporate taxpayer had obtained a two-month extension to file
its income tax return, but still filed it 40 days after the new deadline. 317 F.2d at 834. The
president of the corporate taxpayer testified that he had numerous duties to perform, that the
corporation was in the midst of much turmoil, and that he had thought a further extension
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had made this demand in Fleming, the attorney's failure to file the
extension application presumably would have been discovered and
rectified.38  However, the taxpayer's failure to make that demand
should not have resulted in the imposition of a penalty.38 9 A tax-
payer only has to show that he acted with ordinary business care
and prudence.390 Absent some special circumstance, a taxpayer
who accepts his attorney's oral assurance that he has taken a spe-
cific action clearly is acting with ordinary care.
The court's third reason for holding the Fleming taxpayer liable
was that his attorney was negligent.391 The court correctly found
the attorney negligent in not filing the application for extension and
in advising the taxpayer that the extension was for a year.392 The
court imputed the attorney's negligence to the taxpayer under prin-
ciples of vicarious liability.393 In conclusion, the court stated that
the taxpayer's reliance on the attorney to obtain an extension and
had been obtained. Id. The court sustained the penalty, viewing the filing omission as inten-
tional and noting that the taxpayer had made no effort to seek an additional extension of time
for filing. Id. In Jernigan v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 615 (1975), the taxpayer
visited her accountant's office the day before her 1970 income tax return was due and signed
an application for an extension. Id. at 617. She never inquired whether the extension had
been obtained, and she disagreed with the accountant as to who was supposed to mail the
application. Id. The IRS never received the extension request. Id.
Similarly, in Twin City Constr. Co. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 767 (D.N.D. 1981), the
corporate taxpayer employed its regular accounting firm to prepare its income tax returns.
515 F. Supp. at 768. As the due date approached, it became apparent to both the taxpayer
and the accountants that an extension was needed. Id. This was a familiar procedure to all
involved as similar extension requests, signed by the taxpayer's accountants, had been filed in
prior years. Id. A corporate taxpayer is entitled to an automatic three-month extension if it
pays one-half of its estimated tax liability on or before the original due date. See I.R.C.
§ 6081(b) (1982). Because the accounting firm was unable to estimate the amount of tax due,
it placed the extension application in an audit fie. 515 F. Supp. at 768. The taxpayer's
treasurer neither drew a check to cover the estimated tax liability nor inquired whether the
extension request had been filed. Id.
Although penalties for late filing were correctly imposed in these three cases, each of them
can easily be distinguished from Fleming. In all three, the taxpayer had known that an exten-
sion was needed, but did not check back with the accountant to learn if the extension request
had been granted. This omission was particularly egregious in Twin City Constr. Co., where
the taxpayer had experience in seeking extensions and knew that a necessary part of the
process had not been performed. Id. at 770. In contrast, the personal representative in Flem-
ing had been told that the extension had been obtained, so there was no apparent reason for
him to make further inquiry of his attorney. Fleming, 648 F.2d at 1128.
388. See id. at 1123-24.
389. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
391. 648 F.2d at 1126-27.
392. Id. at 1127.
393. Id. "The taxpayer was charged with the knowledge, or lack of it, of his agent. [Ci-
tations omitted.] Accordingly, the attorney's negligence here cannot be transmuted into rea-
sonable cause for the late filing of the return by the taxpayer." Id.
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file the return within the extended period "did not constitute rea-
sonable cause for the late filing, since the attorney failed to perform
the duties entrusted to him. 39 a
The Fleming court's application of vicarious liability theory in
section 6651(a)(1) penalty cases is not novel. There are hints of it in
other cases,3 9 5 particularly in Judge Swygert's dissent in
Rohrabaugh v. United States.396 The theory has superficial appeal,
but is erroneous as a matter of statutory interpretation, 397 and is
inconsistent with other decisions.398
An imputed negligence theory cannot be reconciled with the
reasonable cause language in section 665 l(a)(1).3 99 A taxpayer who
files late is not automatically subject to a penalty; if he demonstrates
reasonable cause and the absence of willful neglect, his late filing is
excused.' Of course, even if a taxpayer avoids the penalty, the late
filing can have other adverse consequences. For example, an execu-
tor is precluded from making an alternate valuation election under
section 2032."1 Similarly, a person who pays his taxes late is auto-
matically charged interest.4"2 In these situations the consequences
394. Id. But see Willis v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 134, 138-40 (4th Cir. 1984). In Willis,
the taxpayer relied on. his corporate secretary to file his return. The secretary inadvertantly
failed to file it in time. Id. at 138. The court, in finding for the taxpayer, held that an error by
a third party which results in a late filing can constitute reasonable cause under § 665 l(a)(1).
Id. at 140. Here, the court examined the particular facts involved and found that the tax-
payer had "exercised careful business prudence." Id. It concluded that the Tax Court's
imposition of the § 665 1(a)(1) penalty for untimely filing was inappropriate. Id.
395. See Twin City Constr. Co. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 767, 770 (D.N.D. 1981)
(relying on Fleming v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Wis. 1980)); Jernigan v. Com-
missioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 615, 619 (1975).
396. 611 F.2d at 219-20. In Rohrabaugh, it will be recalled, the executrix made no in-
quiry about the deadline, but had she done so, the attorney would have erroneously advised
her that she had one year in which to file. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. Judge
Swygert's dissent was based on an agency theory.
Unless we are to ignore the rudimentary rules of agency, the penalty was cor-
rectly assessed. If the taxpayer had not hired and then relied upon an attorney to
aid her in the discharge of her fiduciary duties, there can be no doubt that unless a
reasonable excuse was offered, she would have suffered the penalty assessed. The
sole excuse she offered is that she hired and then relied on her attorney. That reli-
ance proved to be faulty. Therefore, it cannot be characterized as a reasonable
excuse. This case is as simple as that.
611 F.2d at 220. Judge Swygert reached the correct result in Rohrabaugh, but for the wrong
reason. See supra note 302.
397. See infra notes 398-405, 419-23 and accompanying text.
398. See infra note 406 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
400. Id.
401. See supra note 238.
402. The Internal Revenue Code provides that the payment of tax is due on the date the
return is due. I.R.C. § 6651 (1982). If the taxpayer obtains an extension of time to pay the
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of lateness are automatic and the reasons for it are irrelevant be-
cause those statutes have no escape hatch for reasonable cause.
This is not the case with section 6651(a).4 3
If, however, the adviser's negligence is imputed to the taxpayer,
the reasonable cause exception is vitiated. The taxpayer must
demonstrate that he, not his adviser, acted with ordinary business
care and prudence.' The adviser-agent's negligence cannot be im-
puted to the taxpayer-principal, because such imputation would re-
sult in the taxpayer being penalized for another's conduct. The
effect of section 6651(a)(1)'s exception is to modify the usual rules
of agency law; the court's error in Fleming was not recognizing
this.4°'
Moreover, the court's theory of vicarious liability is inconsistent
with existipg precedent." 6 Because Fleming is a legal advice case,
the rules d~veloped in the "whether" cases should apply.4' 7 One of
those rules provides that an agent's negligence is not imputed to his
principal;" the taxpayer is only responsible for his own conduct.
tax, interest will be due and payable as of the due date of the return. I.R.C. § 6151(a) (1982).
In addition, § 6621 provides for the interest rate to be charged on tax deficiencies and re-
funds. I.R.C. § 6621 (1982). According to this provision, the interest rate is tied to the prime
interest rate charged by commercial banks to their best customers. The Economic Recovery
Tax Act provides that the interest rate is to be set annually at 100% of the prime rate. Id.;
see Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 711, 95 Stat. 172, 340 (1981)
(codified at I.R.C. § 6621 (1982)).
403. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
404. See, eg., Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769, 771 (2d
Cir. 1950); Daley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 808, 811 (D.N.D. 1979).
405. See supra notes 391-96 and accompanying text.
406. Judge Cudahy pointed out in his Fleming dissent that an agency rationale had been
advocated by Judge Swygert in his dissent in Rohrabaugh. See supra note 396. However,
Judge Swygert's views were rejected by the Rohrabaugh majority. See 611 F.2d at 214-15.
Judge Cudahy accurately stated that "[i]f the knowledge of the taxpayer's attorney had been
imputed to the taxpayer in Rohrabaugh, the government would have prevailed." 648 F.2d at
1129. The error in Rohrabaugh was the exoneration of the executrix from liability for her
own negligence in not inquiring about the return's due date. The court was correct, however,
in refusing to impute to the executrix her attorney's negligence in miscalculating the deadline.
407. See supra notes 28-60 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. Vaughn v. United States, 536 F.
Supp. 498 (W.D. Va. 1982) is a recent case in which the administrators avoided liability
where their attorney miscalculated the due date. In Vaughn, the sole beneficiary of the estate
was a 16-year-old boy whose mother and grandfather were shot to death one evening. 536 F.
Supp. at 500. The beneficiary moved in with a neighbor, John E. Vaughn, a machinist who
had no experience in the administration of estates or the preparation of federal estate tax
returns. Vaughn and J. L. Tompkins, III, an attorney, were named as joint administrators.
Id. The attorney erroneously told the beneficiary and the administrator that the federal es-
tate tax return was due 15 rather than 9 months after the decedent's death. Id. at 503. The
court held for the taxpayer, denying imposition of the penalty. As to the beneficiary and Mr.
Vaughn, it determined that their reliance on the attorney was the exercise of ordinary busi-
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Although Fleming is poorly reasoned, it must be recognized, in
fairness to the Seventh Circuit, that the government is responsible
for much of the error. In Estate ofDiPalma v. Commissioner," the
executrix filed late because her attorney represented that she could
delay filing until after the settlement of the will contest.410 The Tax
Court's decision in favor of the taxpayer was based on Estate of
Bradley v. Commissioner.411 The court in Bradley held that the tax-
payer who filed late, but within the time he was advised was avail-
able, was not liable for the penalty.4 12
If the Seventh Circuit had followed DiPalma, it would have held
for the taxpayer in Fleming. Instead, it purported to distinguish
DiPalma by stating that the taxpayer in Fleming knew the due date
of the return.413 This is a disingenuous distinction.41 4 However,
ness care and prudence. 536 F. Supp. at 500, 503-04. As to the attorney, the court stated
that it was also possible (although more difficult) to conclude that he, too, had exercised
ordinary business care and prudence. Id. at 504-05. The court concluded that such care
"does not mean a person cannot make any mistakes." Id. at 504.
As precedent, Vaughn is somewhat unclear. It is difficult to tell from the opinion whether
the court rejected the imputation of negligence theory itself (that is, whether it found for the
beneficiary and Mr. Vaughn because they were permitted to rely on an attorney, even if the
attorney had been negligent) or if instead the court found one aspect of the theory inapplica-
ble (because the attorney was found not to be negligent). A decision on the former ground
would be of broader scope than one on the latter. By comparison, the taxpayers in Paolinelli
v. United States, 43 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1148,301 (N.D. Cal. 1979) were held liable for a
§ 6651(a)(2) late payment penalty when they had received legal advice to delay payment.
The children of the decedent were engaged in several will contests and the payment of estate
taxes was not made until that litigation was completed. Id. at 79-1270. Because the adminis-
trator knew a return must be filed and payment made, the court held the "whether" cases
(pertaining to legal advice) inapplicable. Id. at 79-1273. Instead, the court relied on the
"when" cases, including United States v. Kroll, 547 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1977) and Logan
Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1956). Id.
Although the court's rationale is not entirely convincing, it reached the correct result.
The tax attorney for the estate had written to the IRS requesting that, in view of the will
contest litigation, the Service withhold collection activities and not impose the late payment
penalty. Id. at 79-1271. The Service agreed to the former request, but stated that a decision
as to the penalty would be made at the time of payment. Id. Also, the attorney had sought
an extension of time for filing, but not for payment, although an extension for the latter could
have been granted for a period of up to 10 years from the due date. I.R.C. § 6161(a)(2)(A)
(1982). The taxpayers knew that they were liable for the estate taxes and also knew the
amount due, so they could have effected timely payment. 43 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 148,301, at
1272. Instead, they paid nearly four and one-half years late. Id. at 79-1271. In light of these
facts, the court correctly imposed the penalty. Id. at 79-1273.
409. 71 T.C. 324 (1978); see supra notes 246-66 and accompanying text.
410. 71 T.C. at 325.
411. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 70 (1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1975); see supra notes
230-45, 259-66 and accompanying text.
412. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 73.
413. 648 F.2d at 1126.
414. See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
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the Seventh Circuit is not obligated to follow Tax Court prece-
dent.41 5 Nor is the government obliged to follow the Tax Court; it
can argue that the court's decisions are incorrect and should not be
followed. The IRS, however, acquiesced in DiPalma.416 Having
done this, the Tax Division of the Justice Department should not
have taken a position inconsistent with the IRS before the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits. The government should either withdraw its
acquiescence in DiPalma or, more properly, confess error as to its
position in Fleming, Smith v. United States,417 and Estate of Kerber
v. United States.41
8
IV. THE APPROACH: DIRECT LIABILITY FOR ADVISERS
The statute is flawed because it imposes direct liability only on
the taxpayer and not on his adviser. 19 If a taxpayer exercises ordi-
nary business care and prudence in relying on his adviser, he is not
properly subject to the penalty, even if his adviser is negligent. 420
Conversely, the adviser's liability is derivative; regardless of his own
negligence, he is not held liable if the taxpayer avoids the penalty.42
This is an undesirable state of affairs because it is costly to the
415. The Tax Court, however, will follow appellate precedent that confficts with its own
decisions if the appellate precedent is directly on point and appeal is to that circuit. Golsen v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756-58 (1970), affid, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 940 (1971). Accordingly, in Estate of Zavesky v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH)
1300 (1981), the Tax Court ruled in favor of a late-filing executrix who had not inquired
about the return's due date. This result is inconsistent with other Tax Court decisions. See
supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text. Because the executrix lived in Indiana, however,
appeal would have been to the Seventh Circuit. Therefore, under Golsen, the Tax Court
properly applied Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1979). Cf. Magill v.
Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 859, 872-74 (1982) (penalty imposed on executrix who
filed return more than five and one-half years late; the court did not believe taxpayer's con-
fused, disjointed, and self-serving testimony).
416. 1979-1 C.B. 1. In Marprowear Profit-Sharing Trust v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1086
(1980), the Tax Court declined to impose a § 6651(a) penalty on a taxpayer that relied on its
accountant's erroneous advice that it was not liable for taxes on unrelated business income.
74 T.C. at 1097. This decision is consistent with other legal advice cases in the "whether"
line of authority. See supra notes 28-60 and accompanying text. It also is consistent with
Estate of DiPalma v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 324 (1978). The Internal Revenue Service has
acquiesced in Marprowear. 1983-2 C.B. 1. Although the Service was correct in acquiescing,
its action underlines the inconsistency of the government's position in Fleming, Smith, and
Kerber. See supra notes 308-405 and accompanying text.
417. 702 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1983).
418. 717 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1983).
419. See I.R.C. § 6651 (1982); see also supra note 213 and accompanying text.
420. See supra notes 190-204 and accompanying text.
421. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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Treasury and protects advisers from malpractice suits.422 The best
remedy for the problem is to amend the statute to permit the gov-
ernment to proceed directly against negligent tax advisers.423 This
422. See Boyle v. United States, 710 F.2d at 1258 (Posner, J., dissenting); Rohrabaugh v.
United States, 611 F.2d at 220 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
Amendment of § 6651(a) would also decrease the likelihood of collusive testimony. See
supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text. Derivative liability creates a substantial incen-
tive for postfiling peijury. See supra notes 204-14 and accompanying text. The crucial issues
may be whether the taxpayer made inquiry about the due date or whether he inquired and his
adviser miscalculated the deadline. See supra notes 217-29 and accompanying text. In either
situation, once the penalty has been asserted and research has begun, the attorney will dis-
cover that he can escape the penalty if his client says the right words. If the attorney is
subject to direct rather than derivative liability, his incentive to manufacture collusive testi-
mony will be diminished substantially or entirely.
423. See Fisher v. United States, 36 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 148,010 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
Although the need for statutory change seems clear, working out the details of that
change requires answering a number of difficult questions. An existing provision of the Code,
I.R.C. § 6694(a) (1982), permits imposition of a $100 penalty on a tax preparer who negli-
gently understates a taxpayer's liability on a return or claim for refund. Section 6694(b)
imposes a $500 penalty on a tax preparer whose understatement is willful. If within 30 days
of being penalized the tax preparer pays 15% of the penalty, he may bring a claim for refund
of that payment and ultimately may litigate the liability in federal district court. Id.
§ 6694(c). At first blush § 6694 seems to be the pattern that should be followed in amending
§ 6651(a)(1). The stakes involved in the two sections, however, vary so widely that it is not
clear that § 6694 offers much guidance in the late filing siutation. The penalty involved in
§ 6694 is so small in comparison to the potential § 6651(a)(1) penalty (for example, in Fleming
v. United States, 648 F.2d 1122, 1123 (7th Cir. 1981) the penalty imposed was almost $30,000)
that the tax adviser's response to the former is unlikely to resemble his response to the latter.
An adviser probably will pay a $100 understatement penalty without going to court. Faced
with a $30,000 late filing penalty, he probably will litigate.
If the tax adviser chooses to litigate, difficult questions about party joinder arise. On some
occasions it might be so clear that the person responsible for the late filing is either the tax-
payer or his tax adviser that the government would choose to assert the penalty against only
one of them. In general, however, it would seem to be in the government's interest to assert
the penalty against both the taxpayer and the adviser and let them litigate, between them-
selves, which one should be held liable. This is the government's typical procedural posture
in "responsible person" cases under U.S.C. § 6672 (1982). In § 6672 cases, however, taxpay-
ers must litigate the penalty in a refund suit. Id. § 6672(b)(2). This is because Tax Court
jurisdiction extends to income, estate, gift and certain excise tax cases, but not to employment
tax cases or to the § 6672 penalty. See id. §§ 6213(a), 7442; M. SALZMAN, IRS PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE (1981) 1 1.03[2][a], 9.04[2], at 1-28 to -29, 9-19.
Ideally, if the government seeks to impose the late filing penalty on both the taxpayer and
his tax adviser, those individuals will litigate their liability in the same forum. If, however,
the taxpayer goes into Tax Court and the tax adviser brings a suit for refund in a district
court, there is an obvious risk of inconsistent adjudications. Both individuals may be found
negligent; conversely, neither may be held liable. Procedurally, it would be desirable to have
the individuals in the same court. But can we force them into the same forum? If so, how?
Do we expand the Tax Court's jurisdiction to include the adviser? If so, how does this square
with the normal practice of requiring a notice of deficiency as a prerequisite to Tax Court
jurisdiction? Alternatively, should the taxpayer be forced to litigate the late filing penalty in
the district courts? Should existing Tax Court jurisdiction be withdrawn from income, estate,
or gift tax cases in which a late filing penalty is asserted? Is it fair, advisable, or even consti-
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is particularly important in light of the proliferation of penalty pro-
visions that adopt the reasonable cause language of section
6651(a)(1). 424
Pending statutory change, the courts can achieve the same re-
sult by holding a nonnegligent taxpayer liable for the penalty. If a
return is filed late because the adviser was negligent, the taxpayer
can bring an indemnification action against him. Although there
would be two lawsuits instead of one, the end result would be iden-
tical to that under a direct action statute. The government would
get its money and the financial burden of the penalty would be
borne by the person responsible for the error.425 The question thus
becomes whether achieving this end result justifies penalizing a non-
neglient taxpayer.
In Sarto v. United States,426 the court was presented with an
allegation of deliberate misconduct by an attorney.427 The execu-
tors in Sarto sought to recover the penalty they had paid when the
estate tax return was filed late.428 The government moved to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted,
arguing that the executors had a personal, nondelegable duty to file
the return when due.429 The executors responded with allegations
that their attorney affirmatively had misled them when they in-
quired about the return's due date by telling them that an indefinite
extension of time had been granted.430
tutional to treat differently estate tax cases which involve a penalty than estate tax cases that
do not?
While the need for legislative change to § 6651(a)(1) is apparent, any specific proposal for
reform would need to take into account these questions. Although the questions are impor-
tant ones, the answers to them are sufficiently complex to be outside the scope of this Article.
424. See, eg., I.R.C. §§ 6651(a)(1)-(3), 6652(a)(1), 6676(a), 6677, 6678, 6687, 6688, 6689,
6692, 6693, 6698, 6706(a), 6707(b)(2), 6708(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1984).
425. Not all erroneous advice is attributable to negligence. In particular, the determina-
tion of whether a return is required can be difficult. See supra notes 28-54 and accompanying
text. However, absent unusual circumstances, determining a return's deadline is not very
difficult. Therefore, wrong advice normally reflects negligence. In a number of cases, attor-
neys who have misadvised taxpayers about deadlines have indemnified their clients for the
penalties and then subrogated themselves to the taxpayers' refund claims. Smith v. United
States, 702 F.2d 741, 742 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983); Crouse v. United States, 50 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)
148,552 (S.D. Iowa 1982), affd per curiam, 711 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1983); Olcott v. United
States, 82-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 113,447 (S.D. Ohio 1982). However, the courts have denied the
refund claims and imposed penalties. Smith, 102 F.2d at 743; Crouse, 50 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)
148,552, at 82-6220; Olcott, 82-I U.S.T.C. (CCH) at 13,447.
426. 563 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
427. Id. at 478.
428. Id. at 477.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 478.
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The court denied the motion to dismiss based on its correct un-
derstanding of the central flaw of section 6651(a)(1). Because the
liability of an adviser is only derivative, the effect of exonerating a
nonnegligent taxpayer is to exonerate his adviser. The reason for
holding the taxpayer liable when there is deliberate misconduct by
his adviser is to prevent advisers who engage in actual deceit from
avoiding liability. As the court noted, when a return is filed late
because of attorney misconduct, the taxpayer may recover any pen-
alty imposed in a subsequent malpractice action.431 Indeed, even a
negligent taxpayer-one who failed to inquire about the due date,
or had actual knowledge of the due date but did not ensure a timely
filing-may be able to recover from his adviser, if the primary cause
for the late filing is the adviser's neglect.4"' The court correctly ob-
served that:
If a taxpayer who had been affirmatively misled by his attorney
regarding the date on which his return was due could escape lia-
bility for a penalty while a taxpayer who was passively negligent
could not, the ultimate result would be that attorneys who had
engaged in active deceit would escape liability while attorneys
who were merely guilty of neglect would not.4 33
Given the purpose of the penalty statute, which is to ensure the
collection of revenue,434 the court concluded that, "the statute
should not be enforced so as to encourage attorneys who are merely
guilty of neglect to compound their error and further delay the fil-
ing of a required return by engaging in active deceit of their
clients. '4 3
5
As a matter of policy, the Sarto court probably is correct.
Although it seems unlikely that most advisers deliberately misin-
form their clients about due dates,436 those who do engage in such
blatant misconduct should be penalized.437 Sarto, however, clearly
is inconsistent with the language of both the statute and its accom-
panying regulation. The reasonable cause exception of section
665 1(a)(1) contemplates that a taxpayer can avoid liability if he acts




434. Id. (citing Plunkett v. Commissioner 118 F.2d 644, 650 (1st Cir. 1941); Daley v.
United States, 480 F. Supp. 808, 813 (D.N.D. 1979)).
435. 563 F. Supp. at 478.
436. See supra notes 209-10.
437. But cf Crouse, 50 A.F.T.R.2d (P--I) 148,552, at 82-6220 (even though attorney
engaged in deliberate misconduct, court examined taxpayers' own conduct, found them negli-
gent, and assessed penalty).
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own conduct, not on that of others. Holding a nonnegligent tax-
payer liable because of his adviser's misconduct only can be justified
if the adviser's misconduct is deliberate and there is no other way to
hold him accountable. In contrast, in cases such as Fleming v.
United States,438 Smith V. United States,43 9 and Estate of Kerber v.
United States," the miscalculated due dates resulted from attorney
negligence. 441 There was no suggestion that deliberate wrongdoing
occurred." 2 Mere negligence by advisers is not serious enough to
justify departing from the reasonable cause standard set forth in
section 6651(a)(1). This does not mean the statute should remain
unchanged, but that it should be amended by legislative rather than
judicial action.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of section 665l1(a)(1) is to ensure the collection of
revenue by penalizing the late filing of tax returns. At the same
time, the section's reasonable cause language allows a taxpayer to
be excused from the penalty when he exercises ordinary business
care and prudence. Because of the complexity of the IRC, taxpay-
ers routinely turn to advisers for assistance. When the penalty is
imposed, these taxpayers just as routinely assert that reliance on
their advisers excuses them from the late filing penalties.
The central problem in recent section 6651(a)(1) litigation has
been the Seventh and Eighth Circuits' failure to engage in careful
analysis. The courts have used the phrase "reliance on counsel"
without paying adequate attention to the justifications underlying
the reasonable cause exception. Taxation is an eminently practical
field and the "whether" and "when" authorities reflect practical
considerations. Under the "whether" cases, the taxpayer can rely
on substantively erroneous legal advice whether to file. This is not
because erroneous advice is to be encouraged but because the tax-
payer has no practical means of verifying the answer he receives. 443
Under the "when" cases, the taxpayer cannot escape the penalty on
the sole ground of reliance on an adviser when he knows the due
date of a required return, because through appropriate supervision
of his adviser he can ensure timely filing.
438. 648 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1981), aftfd, 438 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
439. 702 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1983).
440. 717 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1983).
441. See supra notes 308-405 and accompanying text.
442. Id.
443. Fleming v. United States, 648 F.2d 1122, 1128 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have turned these practical
considerations upside down. The Seventh Circuit permits the tax-
payer who does not inquire about deadlines to escape the penalty,
yet holds the taxpayer who has inquired and was misinformed lia-
ble. The Eighth Circuit does require that an inquiry be made, but
joins the Seventh Circuit in not permitting reliance on substantively
inaccurate advice about deadlines. The Seventh Circuit errs by re-
warding ignorance; both circuits err in treating legal advice about
deadlines differently than legal advice about whether to file.
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ADDENDUM
On January 9, 1985, shortly before this Article went to press,
the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Boyle.
444
The Court unanimously reversed the Seventh Circuit and held the
executor, who had failed to inquire about the due date of the estate
tax return, liable for the section 6651(a)(1) late filing penalty. Chief
Justice Burger authored the majority opinion; Justice Brennan
wrote a concurring opinion in which three other Justices joined.
The Court held, for three reasons, that a taxpayer is obligated to
ascertain a return's deadline and make sure that that deadline is
met. First, for administrative purposes, the Court desired to draw a
bright line. The majority observed that deadlines are inherently ar-
bitrary, but added that fixed dates often are essential to accomplish
necessary results. The government, which desires that taxes be paid
promptly, has millions of taxpayers to monitor. In a system of ini-
tial self-assessment, the Court concluded that strict fling standards
must be upheld because less rigid standards risk encouraging a lax
attitude about filing dates." 5
Second, the Court determined that Congress placed the burden
of prompt filing on the executor." 6 The duty of filing is fixed and
clear, the statute is unambiguous, and it is the taxpayer's obligation
to ascertain and meet the statutory deadline. Further, the tax-
payer's duty cannot be discharged by relying on his tax adviser to
fie on time. Although the taxpayer's assumption that the adviser
will meet the deadline "may resolve the matter as between
them,"' such reliance does not relieve the taxpayer of his obliga-
tion to comply with the statute, and thus, is not reasonable cause for
the late filing." 8
Finally, the Court found that taxpayers could meet the burden
of compliance without undue difficulty. As the Court observed,
Boyle was not a case in which the taxpayer relied on erroneous ad-
vice concerning a question of law; the executor was not advised that
it was unnecessary to file a return. The executor also was not mis-
advised about the due date. His failure to fie on time did not result
from an incorrect answer given in response to his inquiry, but from
444. 53 U.S.L.W. 4059 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985).
445. Id. at 4061-62. The Court added that the government "should not have to assume
the burden of unnecessary ad hoe determinations" about whether a return should be filed. Id.
at 4062.
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no inquiry having been made. The Court stated ihat-among th6 first
duties of an executor are: to identify and assemble the decedent's
assets and ascertain his tax obligations. The executor need not be
"a tax expert to know that tax returns have fixed filing dates and
that taxes must be paid when they are due;"' 9 tax returns have
deadlines and it "requires no special training or effort to ascertain a
deadline and make sure it is met."4 '
The Supreme Court's opinion is correct on all major points.
The Seventh Circuit's decisions in Rohrabaugh v. United States4 51
and Boyle v. United States,452 that a taxpayer who knows a return
must be filed can avoid the late filing penalty by failing to inquire
about his responsibilities, were aberrational and poorly reasoned.45 3
The Supreme Court not only corrected this aberration, but did so
for the right reasons. The executor was held liable because he had
breached his own duty to ensure a timely filing, not because his
attorney's negligence was imputed to him.: 4 Thus, the attorney's
negligence was determined to be a matter for resolution under
agency law, rather than being reasonable cause for the taxpayer-
principal's failure to meet his own responsibilities. The Court also
focused correctly on the nature of the task the taxpayer was asked
to perform. He was not asked to decide a question of law about
whether a return was required, but rather to ascertain that return's
deadline and ensure that it was met. The Court's recognition that
one does not have to be a tax expert to know that tax returns have
fixed filing dates is reminiscent of the pragmatic approach to tax-
payer responsibilities taken by the Seventh Circuit in United States
v. Kroll.
455
The Supreme Court may have been overbroad in two respects.
Read properly, Boyle imposes on the taxpayer a duty of inquiry
about the deadline of a return known to be required. Certain lan-
guage in Boyle could lead lower courts to impose liability on taxpay-
ers who were misadvised about the due dates of their returns.45 6
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1979).
452. 710 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1983) rev'd, 53 U.S.L.W. 4059 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1985).
453. See supra notes 76-214 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 398-408 and accompanying text.
455. United States v. Kroll, 547 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1977); see supra notes 101-02 and
accompanying text; see also supra notes 175-78 (executor in Rohrabaugh need not ascertain
due date for estate tax return because income tax due date is much more well known).
Clearly, the Supreme Court rejected the Rohrabaugh court's view in Boyle.
456. For example, the Court noted that Boyle did not involve a taxpayer's reliance on
erroneous advice concerning a question of law. The Court added that when an attorney or
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The imposition of such liability is inappropriate in this situation if
the taxpayer files within the time he has been advised is available,
even if that advice is erroneous. 457 That issue was not before the
Court in Boyle, and indeed, the majority expressly stated that the
Court need not address it.458 Although the Court's refusal to deal
with an issue not squarely before it was entirely proper, it is regret-
table that, in Boyle, the Court used broader language than was nec-
essary. An even greater cause for regret is that the Court has not
accountant advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law, "such as whether a liability exists, it is
reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on that advice." 53 U.S.L.W. at 4062. The reason ad-
vanced by the Court was that most taxpayers are not competent to discern error in the sub-
stantive advice of their tax advisers. Id.; see supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text. The
Court concluded, as the Second Circuit did in Haywood Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 178
F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir. 1950), that to require a taxpayer to challenge the adviser, to seek a
second opinion, or to try to monitor counsel on the provisions of the IRC would nullify the
very purpose of seeking expert advice, and is not required by ordinary business care and
prudence. See also supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
The Court's observation that one does not have to be a tax expert to know that returns
have deadlines also is correct. The majority then states, however, that reliance on an attorney
"cannot function as a substitute for compliance with an unambiguous statute" and that it
"requires no special training or effort to ascertain a deadline and make sure that it is met."
53 U.S.L.W. at 4062. This language is overbroad. It is true that § 6075(a) unambiguously
provides a nine month deadline for the filing of estate tax returns and that it requires no
special training or effort to inquire about that deadline. But if the taxpayer is obligated not
only to inquire, but ascertain the deadline, a literal reading of Boyle indicates that he should
be held liable for a late filing even if he was misadvised about the due date. This literal
reading is reinforced by the Court's citation of Smith v. United States, 702 F.2d 741 (8th Cir.
1983), as authority that reliance on counsel does not constitute reasonable cause. 53
U.S.L.W. at 4061. Smith, of course, involved a situation in which the taxpayer filed after the
actual due date but within the time he was advised was available. See supra notes 303-14 and
accompanying text. It is a bit ominous that the Court states that Smith, Ferrando v. United
States, 245 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1957) and Logan Lumber Co. v. United States, 365 F.2d 846
(5th Cir. 1966), are in conflict with the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Boyle. Ferrando and
Logan Lumber indeed conflicted with Boyle, as, at least tacitly, they imposed a duty of in-
quiry on the taxpayers. Properly read, however, Smith involves a different issue: not whether
a taxpayer must inquire, but whether he reasonably may rely on substantively erroneous
advice concerning a deadline.
457. See supra notes 217-29 and accompanying text. Of course, if the taxpayer has reason
to believe that the advice given to him is erroneous, he should be obligated to make further
inquiry. Absent special circumstances, for example, having been executor of an estate on
some prior occasion, or having actual knowledge of the contents of § 6075(a), the misadvised
taxpayer should escape the late-filing penalty if he fies within the time he has been told is
available. The Supreme Court's rationale in Boyle supports this result. The Court in Boyle
correctly focused on the conduct of the taxpayer, rather than on that of his adviser. It also
noted that requiring a taxpayer "to try to monitor counsel on the provisions of the Code
himself would nullify the very purpose of seeking the advice of a presumed expert in the first
place." 53 U.S.L.W. at 4062. Even though erroneous advice about a deadline probably re-
flects negligence on the adviser's part, the taxpayer's own conduct, in relying on that deadline
and not "monitoring counsel on the provisions of the Code," is reasonable and consistent
with ordinary business care and prudence. Id.
458. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4062 n.9.
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yet granted the taxpayer's petition for certiorari in Estate of Kerber
v. United States. 59 Kerber squarely presents the issue left un-
resolved by the Boyle decision: whether a taxpayer reasonably may
rely on substantively erroneous advice concerning a return's due
date. If certiorari had been granted in Kerber and the case consoli-
dated with Boyle for argument and decision, the Supreme Court
could have resolved this additional area of controversy under sec-
tion 6651(a)(1).46°
Justice Brennan and the three Justices who joined in his concur-
ring opinion also were concerned about possible overbreadth of the
majority opinion.4 6' The concurring opinion emphasized that the
Court had left open the issue "whether and under what circum-
stances a taxpayer who presents evidence that he was unable to ad-
here to the required standard might be entitled to relief from the
penalty. '4 62 Justice Brennan argued that the ordinary business care
and prudence standard is applicable only to the "ordinary person,"
a person who mentally and physically is capable of knowing, re-
membering, and complying with a filing deadline. The majority's
desire to create a bright line test concerned the concurring Justices,
who thought that the outcome might be different if the taxpayer
could demonstrate that, for reasons of incompetence or infirmity, he
was unable to meet the standard of ordinary business care and pru-
dence. Justice Brennan's opinion expressed particular concern
about elderly widows or widowers or other taxpayers who, because
of senility, mental retardation, or other reasons, might be incapable
of attaining society's norm. Because any penalty against the estate
is normally a penalty against such executors' inheritance, the con-
curring opinion stated that "the need for efficient tax collection and
stern incentives" must "yield to other values in appropriate circum-
stances. '4 63 In Boyle, however, the concurring Justices agreed that
the executor was liable because he was fully capable of meeting the
required standard of ordinary business care and prudence.
459. 717 F.2d 454 (8th Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Doting v. United States, 52
U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1983) (No. 83-1038).
460. See supra notes 295-307 and accompanying text. The Court did settle one small
area of controversy, pertaining to the standard of review. Courts vary on whether the exist-
ence of reasonable cause is a question of fact or instead is a mixed question of law and fact.
See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court properly adopted the view
that whether the elements that constitute reasonable cause are present is a question of fact,
but what elements must be present is a question of law. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4062 n.8.
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Justice Brennan's assertion that Boyle did not involve a taxpayer
who subjectively was incapable of knowing, remembering, or com-
plying with a filing deadline is correct. The majority did not resolve
this issue, although they joined the concurrence and intimated that
such a taxpayer would not be penalized."4 It is not clear, however,
that the taxpayer described by Justice Brennan should be able to
escape the penalty. The concurring opinion proposed that the ob-
jective standard be displaced, under certain circumstances, by one
that is subjective. Rather than say that a taxpayer either knows, or
should be treated as if he knows, that returns have deadlines, the
concurrence suggested that a different standard might apply to a
taxpayer who personally is incapable of exercising ordinary business
care and prudence.
Justice Brennan's argument has considerable emotional appeal.
The imposition of penalties on elderly widows and widowers is un-
palatable and his suggestion gives the courts a possible out. Two
concerns become, however, immediately apparent. The first is
whether a plethora of incapacity defenses suddenly will be asserted.
The second, and more serious, is how this suggestion affects a tax-
payer's fiduciary obligations. If the taxpayer agrees to serve as an
executor, he impliedly agrees to discharge certain responsibilities to-
ward the estate.46 If he is physically or mentally incapable of dis-
charging those duties, it seems that it was negligent of him even to
accept the position. Perhaps a distinction could be drawn between
a taxpayer's own return and that of another's, with Justice Bren-
nan's suggestion being adopted with respect to the first, but not the
second, situation. More tenuously, perhaps a distinction could be
drawn between compensated and uncompensated executors, such as
banks and elderly widows. But any exception that holds an execu-
464. The majority left the issue unresolved by its statement that Congress "intended to
place upon the executor an obligation to ascertain and meet the statutory deadline." 53
U.S.L.W. at 4062. The Court also noted that the IRS articulated eight reasons it considered
reasonable cause for a late filing. These are: unavoidable postal delays, timely filing of the
return at the wrong IRS office, delays stemming from the IRS's conduct, the death or serious
illness of the taxpayer or a member of his immediate family, the taxpayer's unavoidable ab-
sence, and the destruction by casualty of his records or place of business. 53 U.S.L.W. at
4060 n.l. The Court added that the principle underlying the IRS's regulations and prac-
tices---"that a taxpayer should not be penalized for circumstances beyond his control"-
might well cover a filing default by a taxpayer who relied on an attorney or accountant be-
cause the taxpayer was, for some reason, incapable by objective standards of meeting the
criteria of ordinary business care and prudence. In that situation, however, the Court
thought the disability alone could be an acceptable excuse for a late filing. 53 U.S.L.W. at
4061 n.6.
465. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
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tor to a subjective, rather than objective, standard should be viewed
with great skepticism.
The Supreme Court held in Boyle that a taxpayer is obligated to
ascertain and comply with statutory deadlines. The decision does
not resolve all the controverted areas under section 665 1(a)(1), but
it is a good start.
